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A SURVEY OF THE STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL
EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE COMPLIANCE AND
PROACTIVITY: TOWARDS A THEORY OF PRECAUTION
IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
ERICA M. MATHENY
ABSTRACT
Millions of factories, chemical facilities, and highways store or convey extremely
hazardous substances (EHS) in proximity to populated residential and commercial areas.
The proliferation of hazardous chemicals in manufacturing has led to thousands of
facilities that store and utilize them throughout the United States. There is inherent risk to
neighborhoods and populated areas located near facilities that use and store hazardous
chemicals. Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were created in 1987 as
stakeholder based, primarily volunteer organizations that address hazardous chemical
accident mitigation. In addition, LEPCs were mandated with the intent of engaging
communities in the debate about hazardous materials. Public safety has also increased in
salience in the United States in particular since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina devastation in New Orleans. More recently, the
earthquakes in Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and most notably Japan have refocused
efforts worldwide on examining policies and practices surrounding disaster management
and response.
This dissertation is an examination of compliance and proactivity in LEPCs and
how use of limited resources influences these factors. A convenient sample of LEPCs in
Ohio was surveyed to gather data for this causally probative study. LEPCs that are more
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compliant and proactive were expected to be in counties with larger, more urban
populations that have more accident experience, and are expected to be in line with
disaster management strategies that emphasize public involvement. The results of this
study show a positive correlation between number of extremely hazardous substance
facilities in a county and the compliance of that county’s LEPC. Other findings include
limited emphasis on provision of information to the public. Emergency planning
resources have been stretched further and further, with additional responsibilities of
homeland security in addition to chemical safety tasks, and little to no additional funding.
The researcher proposes LEPCs look more towards collaboration as a means of ensuring
community security within their limited capacity. Collaboration has been noted amongst
emergency planning agencies between LEPCs and County Emergency Management
Agencies (EMAs), often in the form of shared staff or resources. Collaboration can lead
to greater success for all involved parties. Future research also needs to be completed to
re-conceptualize the idea of LEPC “proactivity” to better capture the diversity of LEPC
activities that may fall under this umbrella. In particular, emphasis on precautionary or
mitigation activities may be a better use of emergency managers’ limited resources. One
of the most significant weaknesses of the current approach, in light of the original intent
of LEPCs as stakeholder-inclusive entities, is access to information. As hazardous
chemical information access has become more limited and restrictive, collaboration
between involved parties and the public is also therefore limited. This may call for more
proactive, creative solutions on the part of regulated industry to ensure emergency plans
contain complete hazard information with proper security protocols maintained.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Across the country, more than 15,000 facilities report to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency that they use large amounts of extremely
hazardous chemicals. The law requires these facilities to disclose potential
chemical accidents, from the most-likely emergencies to a worst-case
scenario. Despite reporting large vulnerability zones and populations at risk,
few chemical-using plants have announced measurable goals or timelines to
reduce the size of the area at risk from a potential worst-case chemical fire
or spill.”
--The Working Group on Community Right to Know (2004)

Background
In the United States, and throughout the developed world, millions of factories,
chemical facilities, and transportation highways store or convey extremely hazardous
substances (EHS). These substances can be found in proximity to heavily populated
residential and commercial areas either at storage facilities or via transportation routes.
Areas where we live, work, and our children go to school are within a stones throw of
“threshold” quantities of EHS, yet we are generally unaware or unconcerned with just
how close we are to these known chemical hazards (Kay County Local Emergency
Planning Committee 2010). The threat of these hazards is real, and the potential for
disaster is a serious matter. Public health and safety has become an issue of importance as
the complexities and complications of the global community become better understood.
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Public safety has also increased in salience in the United States in particular since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina devastation in
New Orleans. More recently, the earthquakes in Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and
most notably Japan have refocused efforts worldwide on examining policies and practices
surrounding disaster management and response. In addition, providing long-term,
sustainable solutions rather than short-term fixes is an important consideration as society
creates and manages problems with long-ranging consequences.
As a response to these disasters, the Federal government has implemented
measures to attempt to ensure continued public safety including a mandate for the
development of local disaster planning. Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs)
were created in 1987 to address disasters involving extremely hazardous chemicals
(EHS) at a local level, using local knowledge. By some, the development of LEPCs are
another government attempt to “shift and shaft” an unfunded mandate on already overtaxed localities (O'Leary, 1995). Much of the work done by LEPCs is completed on an
unpaid, voluntary basis. Committees have either no or extremely limited funding. For
others, this novel approach to disaster planning is seen as a positive way to involve
stakeholders and inform the public of hazards in “their backyard”. The informed public,
in turn, are theoretically to respond by demanding change from their local legislators,
resulting in a bottom-up sort of regulation. In order for this stakeholder-based system of
disaster management to function as intended, informing and educating the public is a
critical step. Without information and access, the public is unable to address accident/
exposure risk within their community.
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Information is to be made accessible to the public by LEPCs in several ways.
Information is primarily made public through the provision of Material Safety Data
Sheets (MSDS), detailing quantities and specific hazards of EHS stored and used at
nearby facilities. Secondly, publicly announced meetings are to be held to discuss hazards
and disaster planning and management. These forums are intended to provide
transparency and public inclusion in disaster planning.
To place the development of LEPCs within the historical context of the American
environmental movement, the researcher will provide a brief historical overview. The
environmental movement of the 1970’s led to far-reaching and historic changes in
American environmental policy. This spanned from the creation of the USEPA and the
first Earth Day in 1970 to the development of water, air, and land pollution legislation
over the next few decades that required industry to change how they do business and
work to clean up past mistakes. Companies that did not meet newly set environmental
quality standards were fined or otherwise penalized. This “command and control” style
policy resulted in sweeping reductions in human health hazards (such as lead in gasoline)
and environmental pollution (such as new heavy metal pollution entering rivers and
streams). The political and economic policy of the 1980’s that followed, under thenPresident Reagan, was less favorable towards environmental regulation and represented a
political swing towards the reduction of the regulatory burden on corporations overall.
The environment was stuck between a figurative “rock and a hard place”; between
those who felt that regulation wasn’t doing enough and environmental clean-up efforts
were too slow, and those who felt that too much time and money was being spent on what
was considered as needless environmental regulation. The demands of big business
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clashed with efforts to clean up the toxic environmental legacy of the industrial
revolution and further development. LEPCs were created during this tumultuous time in
U.S. environmental policy.
In 1987, Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were created as a step
towards addressing recognized chemical hazards in a democratic, collaborative fashion.
LEPCs bring together local stakeholders and representative parties to develop decisionmaking and planning processes for managing and responding to catastrophic
emergencies. LEPC members represent stakeholders and community members such as
firefighters, hospital personnel and environmentalists (see Table 1 for complete list), who
together decide how best to manage known community hazards. In addition, LEPCs work
to advocate for reduction of hazards within their jurisdiction.
Table 1.
List of LEPC Representatives
LEPC Representative Membership
State elected officials

Environmental groups

Local elected officials

Transportation officials

Police

Hospital officials

Firefighters

Regulated facility representatives

Civil defense

Community groups

Public health professionals

Local media

Legislative Background
In the 1970’s, American attention was focused on addressing and managing
chemical and natural disasters piecemeal, as they occurred. Governors, politicians, and
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others were concerned with the lack of a national comprehensive policy or plan for
managing disasters. In 1979, the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) was created, along with the 1979 publication of the text: Comprehensive
Emergency Management-A Governor's Guide. This was the first document to introduce
the idea of “comprehensive emergency management.” It focused on four primary
functional areas, which continue to be important in all emergency management
approaches today: mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and response. Comprehensive
emergency management (CEM) was an important historic pillar of present day
emergency management in that it categorized emergency management (EM) into
functional areas and worked to identify the primary activities necessary to the tasks.
In 1985, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) created the
National Emphasis Program, which focused attention on practices and procedures for
chemical safety and security in large manufacturing plants (Gray, 2002). Shortly after,
EPA augmented the OSHA program with the Chemical Emergency Preparedness
Program (CEPP), which was a purely voluntary program to provide information to
concerned localities about air pollutants in their area (Gray, 2001). During this time,
states and localities were organizing a series of right-to-know plans on their own, with
around 30 states and/or metropolitan areas requiring information from industry by 1986
(Gray, 2002).
In 1986, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA),
under Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA III)
mandated the creation of the first LEPCs (Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act, 1986). EPCRA was created to enhance and support CEPP by unifying the
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legal patchwork of state and local programs and practices responsible for mitigating
chemical spills and providing information to the public. LEPCs were created to
encourage stakeholder and community participation in the emergency planning process
(such as in the event of a chemical accident), and are comprised of a diverse range of
representatives of stakeholder groups within each county jurisdiction. Figure 1 shows the
theoretical emergency management model that SARA III was intended to articulate.

Figure 1. SARA III Model for Emergency Management (adapted from
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RAV/conf/IDRiM07/Papers/Lindell.pdf).

EPCRA was the United States’ federal response to concerns about chemical
safety and security after several devastating incidents involving exposure to hazardous
chemicals. The first was a 1984 Union Carbide chemical accident in Bhopal, India, which
killed an estimated 3,800 people and permanently injured thousands more (Union
6

Carbide Corporation, 2001). A few months after the Bhopal accident, a similar, though
much smaller scale, accident occurred involving methyl isocyanate again at a Union
Carbide pesticide facility in Kanawah Valley, West Virginia.
When implementing EPCRA, states were given the freedom to interpret the word
“local” in the means best fitting their state. As such, the implementation of EPCRA varies
on a state by state basis, as some states interpreted the law into the creation of countylevel LEPCs, others developed the groups based on densely-populated areas (such as
metropolitan urban areas), or the recommendations of local industry. Ohio chose to base
its LEPCs at the county-level.
Further legislation has been developed since this time addressing hazardous
materials security issues. This includes the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the 2007
development of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. These rules address
risk-based performance standards, including the development of Security Vulnerability
Assessments, along with the creation and implementation of Site Security Plans for
vulnerable facilities. While important, these newer rules focus on mitigation and security,
and do not address the underlying vulnerability inherent in possessing and storing large
quantities of extremely hazardous substances.
It is interesting to note that the U.S. legislative attempt at managing chemical
disasters is novel when compared with the framework set out to manage natural disasters.
Natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. are primarily handled from a
national or “top-down” level by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Local organizations, including LEPCs, are provided with the tools to locally plan for
these situations, but local organizations are in general not the primary decision-makers
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and planners for managing natural catastrophes when they occur. In general, natural
disaster planning is not handled in as democratic or stakeholder-inclusive a process as is
chemical disaster planning.
LEPCs are unique in that they are intended to incorporate citizen-participants in
the planning process. EPCRA, the legislation responsible for LEPCs, was described by
Goldman (1991) as “what may be the most important advance in U.S. information policy
since the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).” This represents a shift in policy from
“command and control” style environmental regulation with its agency-heavy, top-down
approach at setting and enforcing regulations to a more participatory, public-mediated,
democratic approach to managing regulation locally. As illustrated in Figure 1, EPCRA
was built on the idea that local stakeholders would “step up” and take responsibility for
managing risk by lobbying their legislatures, once the hazard information was made
available to them.
This has also been described as a transformation from direct regulation of
environmental problems to “informational regulation” (Kleindorfer & Orts, 1998). Case
(2001) also suggests that this more participatory regulation is an excellent addition to
traditional “command and control” regulation by improving efficiency and flexibility in a
cost-effective manner. There is some evidence to back up these claims. Santos et al.
(1996) found improvement in production processes and increased communication and
cost-effectiveness amongst regulated industry as a response to SARA III implementation.
The Toxics Release Inventory Program (TRI), also created under EPCRA,
collects information in a database on nearly 700 toxic chemicals released or disposed of
in communities throughout the United States (http://www.epa.gov/tri/). This information

8

is available to the public on USEPA’s website, and can be searched by zipcode. Despite
some of the accuracy issues known to TRI data (Bowen et al., 1995), it is still some of the
best available aggregate information we have to date. That being said, quantities of TRI
emissions decreased by more than 45% between the year 1988 (after the implementation
of EPCRA) and the year 1995. Public pressure, or informational regulation, is argued to
be effective, whether it takes the form of stock valuations of publicly traded companies
after release of TRI data (Konar and Cohen, 1997) or public company surveys (Santos,
Covellos, and McCallum, 1996). The “fear of embarrassment” became the biggest reality
for many companies subject to the new EPCRA rule (Wolf, 1996; Templeton and Kirk,
2008). Wolf (1996) argues that access to TRI data by environmental groups, government
agencies, mass media, and industry itself forced the regulated industries towards
voluntary reform.
The toxic chemicals regulated under EPCRA are called extremely hazardous
substances (EHS). EHS are defined and categorized by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA), and specifically identified and regulated in Chapter 40 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR part 355). These chemicals are considered to be
extremely hazardous when housed, transported or moved above threshold planning
quantities (TPQ) (USEPA, 2009). TPQ is the quantity of a substance that triggers
reporting requirements to the USEPA. In other words, when a substance is stored or used
in a specified amount considered hazardous, for example at or above 500 pounds, it must
be reported to local government authorities to facilitate emergency planning. The amount
varies by substance type (the actual chemical) and form (solid, liquid gas). The only
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industry regulated under EPCRA is that with TPQ of EHS. There are thousands of small
firms housing EHS in combinations and quantities less than TPQ that go unregulated.
The potential threat to communities’ basic health and safety posed by proximity to
large quantities of EHS is being managed by EPCRA . Many facilities, however, that
either store or manufacture large quantities of extremely hazardous chemicals are situated
within close proximity to residential neighborhoods, schools and businesses. Most, if not
all, communities have highways and railroads that run through them where hazardous
materials are transported nearby on a regular basis. Even if the terrorist threat to these
communities is never realized, the risk to both human health and the natural environment
from “normal” or inevitable accidents and chemical spills is statistically unavoidable over
the long term (Perrow, 1984).
The term “normal accident” was coined by Perrow to describe specific situations
under a narrow series of high-risk conditions that include tight coupling, interactive
complexity, and sometimes operator error (1984). “Interactive complexity” refers
specifically to instances where there are multiple layers of complexity within a system
with consequences and results that we cannot accurately predict given our current
understanding and modeling limitations (Marais, Dulac, & Leveson, 2004). These are
frequently the circumstances under which EHS are held. Under these conditions, Perrow
defines components of tightly coupled systems as those that have rapid and profound
impact on each other, in which case intervention may only function to further complicate
problems rather than solve them. This tight coupling is complicated further by inherent
interactive complexity within the defined system. Interactive complexity is defined as
conditions in a system in which the presence of several individual, unrelated or “discrete”
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failures would result in further unforeseen complications. In plain English, this means
that the complexity is the result of the interaction of two or more unrelated processes in a
system. This type of complexity can be seen as inherent within the system, as it is
intrinsic or essential within the process.
All these characteristics (tight coupling, interactive complexity, and operator
error) in an unpredictable, technologically complicated system can lead to the
development of normal accidents. “The old parable about the kingdom lost because of a
thrown horseshoe has its parallel in many normal accidents: the initiating event is often,
taken by itself, seemingly quite trivial. Because of the system's complexity and tight
coupling, however, events cascade out of control to create a catastrophic outcome”
(Piccard, 2005). The most common and obvious example of such a situation may be a
nuclear energy facility. Very small errors can quickly spiral “out of control” in such
environments, resulting in unforeseen consequences, even when the best attempts at
controlling for such errors are taken into account. It is for this reason that in addition to
attempting to control for errors and create safety checks in complex situations, it is also
prudent to strive towards actions that reduce inherent hazards themselves.
Hazard Reduction Activity
Hazard reduction activities are sometimes described by the term, “Inherent
safety”. The idea of inherent safety has been advocated in the United Kingdom (UK)
since a 1974 factory disaster in Flixborough, Britain (Kletz, 1996). A caprolactam (a
precursor to nylon) manufacturing plant in the small village of Flixborough, Britain
exploded June 1, 1974, killing 28 and injuring 36 more. Nearby villages as far as eight
miles away were structurally damaged from the blast, and it took more than ten days to
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control the resultant fires. Out of this experience, the concept of inherent safety became
publicly salient in the UK as a means of trying to prevent, rather than mitigate, future
catastrophes. Inherent safety may include a variety of different activities, including
intensification, substitution, attenuation, limitation of effects, and simplifying (Mannan,
Rogers et al. 2003).
Intensification is the simple reduction of the quantity of hazardous chemicals
stored/ housed at the chemical plant. Substitution involves the use of a less harmful
substance in place of a hazardous one. Attenuation means working with chemical(s)
under less severe conditions, such as a reduced temperature or pressure. Limitation of
effects results from a move towards safer facility design or process conditions, rather than
potentially faulty process safety controls. Finally, facilities that are simpler are far less
likely to experience failures than plants that are complex in design, structure and process.
LEPCs may help reduce hazards by aiding facilities in the performance of
inherent safety opportunity audits, which point out opportunities for chemical facilities to
use inherently safer means; by providing educational materials to facilities on the benefits
of reducing hazards, and/or by awarding hazard reduction steps through public relations
recognition or other approaches.
Context Within Which LEPCs Operate
Since 2001, LEPCs have been given a greater role in carrying out terrorist
prevention activities by helping to facilitate the application of homeland security
legislation on a local level. LEPCs were originally created with a range of responsibilities
surrounding the response to and management of chemical disasters. Their mandated tasks
include providing information to the public through community right-to-know requests,
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collecting data for annual chemical inventories for facilities within each jurisdiction
through reporting on Materials Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), conducting disaster drills,
and working under the supervision of the State Emergency Planning Commission
(SERC) and the State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in conjunction with
county Emergency Management Agencies (EMA) to create local emergency plans
(USEPA, 2011).
In many cases, LEPCs work in tandem with area organizations and neighboring
LEPCs in order to develop emergency plans and practice drills that more accurately
reflect the nature of true EHS emergencies. As the EHS don’t respect jurisdictional
boundaries, adequate emergency planning must take this into account and allow for
cross-cooperation and coordination between adjacent areas. There is evidence of LEPCs
acting cooperatively with each other and with other nearby agencies towards emergency
planning and management (Franklin County EMA, 2010; Gablehouse, 2007; Templeton
& Kirk, 2008).
Statement of Research Question:
There are 2 main questions that will be addressed by this research:
How compliant and proactive are LEPCs, measured using Starik et al.’s
(2000) Compliance-Proactivity index?
What contextual factors are correlated with the compliance and proactivity
scores of LEPCs?
This project was designed to explore the compliance and proactivity of LEPCs,
and to examine these factors in relation to selected criteria that vary amongst groups. If
one were to imagine LEPC compliance on a one-dimensional plane, it would extend from
groups that are essentially not compliant, not functioning or defunct (fulfilling less than
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five of the requirements developed by Starik et al., 2000). LEPCs classified in this group
are not in compliance with state regulations or federal law.
Starik et al.’s (2000) second category consists of groups that are “mostly
compliant”, i.e., they adequately meet some or most of their legislative and regulatory
goals (those meeting 5-6 requirements listed). These LEPCs meet the majority of the
statutory requirements listed in EPCRA and the state regulatory requirements. This
category will follow requirements set out in the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio
Administrative Code (ORC and OAC Ch. 3750.) This includes the creation of a local
emergency plan, in conjunction with the county EMA, which must be approved by a
majority of county LEPC members, and revised and updated annually by October 17. The
plan must also be coordinated with those of adjoining planning districts. Emergency
plans must be approved by SERC or are subject to revision requirements. If emergency
planning requirements aren’t met by LEPCs, 50% of the planning portion of SERC’s
grant funding to the LEPC will be cut. If there are no changes, an LEPC can submit a “no
change” letter to the state in lieu of an updated plan.
These “mostly compliant” LEPCs also regularly perform emergency exercises,
which consist of tabletop drills, functional drills, and full-scale drills. Exercises are
performed by each county on a four-year rotation, with the current rotation being from
2010-2013. Each four-year cycle is expected to contain one of each of the above types of
exercises with at minimum one exercise occurring annually. Two actual incidents may be
substituted for exercises within a four-year cycle if they fit criteria listed within the OAC.
An LEPC’s annual hazardous materials exercise can be combined with a County
Emergency Management Agency (EMA) exercise, but must still comply with all of the

14

SERC’s exercise rules and requirements. Each exercise must involve either a “fixed
extremely hazardous substances facility” or a “transporter of regulated chemical cargo,”
and can include any chemicals designated as “extremely hazardous” under OAC 3750081.
Finally, the third category stipulated by Starik at al. (2000) includes groups that
are “compliant”, fulfilling seven to nine requirements on the compliance scale (See Table
2).
In addition to the Compliance Scale, there is a Proactivity Scale, which examines
some of the activities that might be seen by an LEPC working towards hazard reduction,
accident and/or pollution prevention, and related activities. Groups were categorized one
of three ways on this scale: very proactive if they fulfilled five or more factors, somewhat
proactive if they fulfilled at least three factors, and not proactive if they completed zero
factors (Starik et al., 2000).
The proactive factors encourage the use of accident prevention or mitigation
techniques through conventional or secondary means. These are means of preventing and
controlling accidents through containment methods, control systems, and prevention
methods that do not remove or reduce inherent hazard of materials or processes.

1

A complete list of more than 3,000 chemicals regulated under EPCRA is available at EPA’s
website at the following address:
http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/chem/list_of_lists_revised_7_26_2011.pdf. This “list of
lists” includes all chemicals regulated under EPCRA sections 302 and 313, and those regulated
under the Clean Air Act section 112(r) for accidental air release.
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Table 2.

Starik et al. (2000) factors to determine compliance and proactivity level of LEPCs.2
Compliance Factors

Proactivity Factors

Have a chairperson

Meeting quarterly or more often

Have a community emergency

Making informed hazard reduction,

coordinator

accident prevention, or pollution

Having an information coordinator

prevention recommendations to

Holding regular meetings

industry/ local government

Advertising meetings to the public

Incorporating or having a strategy

Developing and emergency response

to incorporate risk management

plan (ERP)

information (RMP) into ERP within

Submitting ERP it to the SERC

the year*

Publishing newspaper notice about

Updating the plan within the past

availability of ERC

year

Reviewing the plan in the past year

Practicing the plan within the past
year
Incorporates “proactive” terms in
mission statement**

*RMPs are now “commonplace” and no longer an indicator of proactive engagement
** Not a part of previously developed assessment

LEPC support of these practices may come in a variety of forms, including any of the
following: Operator training, accident and near-miss investigation, promotion of use of
automatic shut-offs within facilities, secondary containment systems, deluge systems
and/or other means to contain and maintain control of hazardous material (Greenburg,
2006). Chemical facilities may also reduce hazard level by changing from a less to more
2

The factors included in these scales aren’t scalable in a Guttman sense, as they may be
completed in any order and any particular factor may be missing from an LEPCs tasks. Instead
each factor included comprises one of the legislatively required steps for compliance with
EPRCA and State regulations or additional tasks noted in the literature and in practice as
“proactive” steps, respectively.
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stable state of a hazardous input material (e.g. liquid or solid vs. gas), storing a smaller
quantity of a hazardous material onsite, altering the temperature or pressure under which
the hazardous material is used, and/or substituting a safer input material. LEPCs may
foster such behavior on the part of industry, through the use of incentive programs,
awards, and information or training. Inclusion of proactive terms in the LEPC mission
statement was added by this researcher as an additional measure of LEPC commitment to
proactive or hazard-reduction activities.
Objectives of Research and Significance
In general, the intent of this study is to identify and compare compliance and
proactivity in local emergency planning committees, along with examining factors that
are related to variations in compliance and proactivity. More proactive emergency
planning may result in reduced risk to the public, through either efforts to reduce hazard
levels, or better and more effective planning for accidents. There are three primary
objectives. The first is to increase knowledge of emergency planning amongst researchers
and academics, along with improved conceptualization of the definition of what makes an
“effective,” “compliant,” and “proactive” LEPC in the literature. Secondly, this research
will provide a “snapshot” of the activities of working LEPCs along with insight into the
effectiveness and functionality of emergency planning, nearly 25 years after its inception
as a nationally organized activity. Thirdly, this study will also examine whether LEPCs
are fulfilling their legislatively intended function of informing the public. If the intention
of EPCRA was to regulate the chemical industry by providing public access to data on
chemicals in their neighborhood, this is a critical component of their mandated task.
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LEPCs in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have been the subject of
published research studies. This is the first study the author is aware of to focus on a
sample in the state of Ohio. USEPA has completed three nationwide surveys of LEPCs,
which have been primarily practitioner surveys, without theoretical or statistical analysis
beyond frequencies and cross-tabulations. This research study will take a unique
approach by examining emergency planning by LEPCs on a sample in Ohio and looking
for relationships between the respective levels of compliance and proactivity, and
demographic and other factors. Are more compliant LEPCs located in more urban,
populous counties? Are more proactive LEPCs those that have had more first-hand
experience with accidents? Is the level of compliance and proactivity in the Ohio LEPC
sample similar to that of LEPCs in the United States overall?
To the author’s knowledge, a comprehensive examination of Ohio’s LEPCs has
not been performed prior to this, and the results will provide practical information to both
state and local entities in addition to the academic community. Comparison of this
study’s results with those of nationwide LEPC research will help determine the
generalizability of this study. There is at this point, no known reason to presuppose the
results in Ohio would be any different than nationwide averages for LEPC compliance
and proactivity.
If insight can be obtained into the relationship between compliance or proactivity
and demographics such as county population size, urbanization of county, or hazard or
accident experience, it might be possible to eventually develop a prescriptive or best
practices approach to improve emergency planning. It is unknown at this point whether
counties with more proactive LEPCs are “safer” from the perspective of less hazard or

18

fewer accidents. The researcher is hopeful that a clear relationship might exist between
the active work of LEPCs and safer, more informed communities, as this was the intent
of the legislation that created them. Inclusion of local stakeholders in an open, transparent
forum is an American ideal of democracy in action. Emergency planning, within this
framework, is intended to promote buy-in into an environment that communities can
agree upon as safe and equitable.
This research will use correlation methodologies to examine the relationship
between variables. An established scale is used to determine variation in a range of
factors. This exploration applies a strategic framework to empirically identify factors
related to why some LEPCs are more proactive and/or compliant than others. The factors
to be studied will be discussed thoroughly within the context of emergency management
and planning overall.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
“What you don't have can't leak."

-Trevor Kletz

Preface to Literature Review
At the outset of this study, the researcher began with an interest in the
Precautionary Principle (PP). Like sustainability, there are many definitions and
constructions of the PP in the literature, but one of the most commonly referred to
definitions comes from the Wingspread Conference on Precaution. The Wingspread
Conference on the Precautionary Principle was a 1998 meeting of academics, treaty
negotiators, environmentalists, and activists to discuss the use of the PP in environmental
and health public policy decisions (http://www.sehn.org/wing.html, 1998). An excerpt
from the Wingspread Statement defines the PP as follows:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause
and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this
context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the
burden of proof. The process of applying the Precautionary Principle must
be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected
parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of
alternatives, including no action (http://www.sehn.org/wing.h-tml, 1998).
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With this in mind, the researcher began conversations with faculty, discussions
with fellow graduate students, and a review of the literature in relevant fields. This led to
an investigation into the application of the PP in the hazardous chemical industry; that is
the idea of Inherent Safety. Inherent safety is a concept that applies to reducing the
quantity, quality, or character of hazards, rather than the mitigation of risk from hazard.
This is an idea that has gained traction in some areas of EHS use. Further research led to
an interest in Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) as organizations that are
in some instances actively working to implement or promote the use of Inherent safety
concepts, a priori the PP. Phone and in-person conversations were undertaken with LEPC
practitioners and experts at other Universities. It became apparent that there is a range of
activity level amongst LEPCs, potentially due to funding, experience, or location
differences, among others. In the interest of reducing repetition, the terms “inherent
safety”, “proactive”, and “precautionary” will be used interchangeably with the same
meaning throughout this literature review.
As a brief review, LEPCs are primarily volunteer-run county-level organizations
that were created under mandate in 1987 by SARA Title III. Their purpose was
principally to manage the collection and dissemination of information about local
chemical hazards, including TRI data. In addition, they are required to develop, practice,
and test an emergency plan regularly in case of a chemical disaster. Anecdotal evidence
and objective research shows variation in LEPC performance between jurisdictions
within a state, and between states. One potential source of this variation may be funding
differences between groups. Adequate financial support for managing disasters
effectively is still lacking in emergency management programs according to Waugh
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(Waugh 2000; Waugh 2007). While some LEPCs are essentially unfunded, others are
able to secure more funding, increasing their capacity for effectiveness. Organizational
capacity is a well-known antecedent to organizational effectiveness (Misener and
Doherty, 2009).
The literature also points towards other factors as potential reasons for variation
as well. The current body of knowledge about Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPCs) focuses on effectiveness, and specifically on how LEPCs are performing
relative to their stated mission. Relevant areas within the body of LEPC knowledge will
be discussed as they contribute and relate to this research. Six central themes will be
addressed in this literature review, including: 2.1 general review of emergency planning
history and research, 2.1 informational regulation, 2.2 organizational theory and LEPC
effectiveness, 2.3 disaster management frameworks, 2.4 compliance and proactivity, 2.5
theoretical presuppositions, 2.6 questions and hypotheses.
Emergency Planning
Researchers in various fields have studied emergency planning and hazardous
chemical management. This chapter will include a brief overview of the study of
emergency planning and hazardous chemical mitigation within several bodies of
literature. A proportion of the literature available is also practitioner-oriented, as
emergency management is a practical, evidence-based and results-driven field.
The origins of emergency planning as a field of study rest in the environmental
policy literature. The environmental policy literature portrays an evolution of
environmental regulation from “command and control” or “standards and enforcement”
style regulation in early U.S. environmental legislation, to more “participatory
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regulation”. Beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA),
environmental regulation took the format of rules and standards set by the EPA for
pollution control, followed by enforcement by the government agency to ensure
compliance. While there was marked success with this strategy (e.g. cleaner water, lead
removal from gasoline, removal of Chloroflourocarbons [CFC’s] from products), it
wasn’t always effective or popular as the political climate evolved in the 1980’s. Experts
complained that command and control regulation didn’t offer economic incentive options
(more carrot, less stick), and that it required too much of government to specify
appropriate means and technologies to manage highly complicated pollutants and
processes (Rosenbaum 1998).
One of the primary foci of emergency or disaster planning is management of
EHS. Although there are as of 2012, more than a dozen laws enforced by the EPA
regarding EHS in the U.S. including the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Railroads
Act of 2008, the Hazardous Materials Transportation and Uniform Safety Act
(HMTUSA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the Chemical Facilities Security Act (CFSA),
[M]ost of these laws are burdened by the daunting variety of materials to
be regulated, by inadequate data on the distribution and effect of these
substances on humans and the environment, by political and
administrative impediments to implementation, and by widespread public
criticism and distrust (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 224).
In addition to market-based mechanisms as economic incentives, EPCRA was a bold step
towards more participatory-based regulation. According to Goldman (1991, p.20-1)
EPCRA “may be the most important advance in U.S. public information policy since the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)… [and has] evolved within the larger historical
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context of increasing pressures to democratize American regulatory processes.” The
development and contribution of voluntary regulatory processes is an important step in
the history of emergency management as it shows a noteworthy shift in the regulatory
framework.
Out of this historical precedent, EPCRA was amended to create LEPCs and the
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). This was an important step towards what has been
described as “informational regulation”(Kleindorfer and Orts 1998). Informational
regulation provides environmental information directly to local entities and citizens,
promoting a more efficient, cost-effective, bottom-up approach (Case 2001). This is in
direct contrast to previous “top down” models of command-and-control style
environmental regulation.
Implementation of EPCRA mandated the creation of LEPCs along with
supporting state level organizations, along with a series of criteria to fulfill the role of
emergency preparedness in case of natural or man-made disaster. Compliance with these
legislative mandates is complicated, at times tricky, and generally minimally funded or
unfunded (O’Leary, 1995). The burden of implementation has been left at the local
government level, without adequate financial support for the task. How this task has been
managed will be discussed, along with the shifting emphasis and need for different types
of emergency planning in a post 9/11 “homeland security” environment.
While a fair amount of research has been done on emergency response to natural
disasters, research on response to chemical and man-made disaster is a growing field.
Humanity’s intensive development and use of hazardous materials and chemicals is
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arguably a field most rapidly developed in the post-World War II era. Inevitably, any
study of disaster management unfolded from necessity out of this newer field.
Tierney, Lindell, and Perry state that more research is needed to characterize the
structure of local emergency preparedness networks (2001). It isn’t completely clear how
some factors, such as funding, personnel, community interest or use of technology
influence preparedness. Why do different emergency management agencies vary in their
approaches to emergency preparedness and choose to emphasize one particular planning
strategy over another? The topic is still being explored, and is constantly evolving due to
changing legislative requirements and demands on over-strapped localities.
Disaster Management Frameworks
The primary frameworks in the disaster management literature are examined as
context for the functionality of LEPCs. There are two connected literature streams laid
out concerning disaster management. The first is “foundational” concepts and
frameworks discussed in the development of the field of disaster management. This
historical component is an important stepping-stone towards more contemporary disaster
management. Contemporary disaster management approaches include those more
currently being debated in the literature. There is not clear consensus as to the best use of
emergency planners extremely limited resources.
First a brief definition of each of the four functional areas of emergency
management is introduced below. Mitigation is “sustained action taken to reduce or
eliminate long-term risk to people and their property from hazards and their effects”
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011). Mitigation can be thought of like
insurance. The second functional area of emergency management is preparedness.
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Preparedness (see Figure 2) is defined by the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) as “ a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising,
evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination
during incident response” (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011).

Figure 2. Preparedness Cycle (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011)

Response is the third functional area of emergency management. The Department of
Homeland Security (2008) defines response as “ immediate actions to save lives, protect
property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the
execution of emergency plans and actions to support short term recovery”. Finally,
recovery is the activities undertaken by communities and individuals to return to
“normal” after a disaster or incident occurs. This might include activities such as
obtaining financial assistance, physical clean-up of affected areas, and other remediation
steps.
A framework can be thought of as a basic conceptual structure or system of ideas,
underlying a theory or notion. The field of emergency planning has developed several
distinct research frameworks with which to examine disaster planning and mitigation.
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Some of the earliest discussions of disasters in the literature were framed within three
different approaches: natural hazards, civil defense, and comprehensive emergency
management (CEM)/ integrated emergency management (IEM) framework. Current
emergency planning concepts are built on the foundation of these ideas. The more recent
approaches include disaster resistance, disaster resilience, comprehensive emergency
management, sustainable emergency management, and vulnerability management. Each
of these approaches can be “plotted” over the four functional areas of emergency
management, according to their primary focus and intention (see Fig. 3). The figure
below visually compares the relative emphasis and focus of each contemporary
emergency management framework within the context of the four functional areas of
emergency management. Each framework and its position within the context of the figure
are described in detail below. The four quadrants represent the major areas of attention
and energy for emergency managers to direct their efforts. The focus of the groups can
vary, which is where the different approaches noted in the literature become relevant.

Figure 3. Emergency Management Approaches overlayed on Functional Areas (adapted from Zingale,
2008)
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Foundational emergency management frameworks. The natural hazards
framework focused on the impact of natural hazards as disasters (O’Keefe et al, 1976).
This was problematic in that a natural disaster is not in and of itself a disaster. It is the
when, where, and how of the event that make it potentially catastrophic. McEntire points
out that some natural hazards, like floods, are actually environmentally beneficial (2005).
The perspective from which the hazards are viewed in this framework is potentially selflimiting, as it does not allow for consideration of such perspectives. Another shortcoming
of this viewpoint is its focus only on natural hazards, not on manmade or terrorist hazards
(McEntire, 2005).
Alternatively, the civil defense framework bloomed from the Cold War era
climate of “mutually assured destruction” from hostilities with the Soviet Union
(McEntire 2005). The idea of a true Soviet threat to the American people forced cities to
make evacuation plans for potential nuclear catastrophe. While historically important, the
focus of this framework was often unrealistic, short-sighted, and fraught with uncertainty
(Dynes 1994). As the name indicates, it focused primarily on emergency planning
through the development of civil defense strategies.
Comprehensive emergency management (CEM) takes some of the strengths from
the previous two frameworks and builds on them. The National Governors’ Association
adopted CEM as its national emergency management policy in 1979 (National Governors
Association 1979). CEM was an attempt to coordinate and integrate the various types of
disaster management strategies and actors involved into a cohesive unit in order to
improve response to all types of disasters (Godschalk 1991). While an improvement on
integrating mitigation and post-disaster coordination, this framework did little to attend to
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disaster prevention or more proactive approaches (McEntire 2005). As illustrated in
Figure 3 above, CEM focuses primarily on the areas of recovery and response, with
minor emphasis on preparation (as indicated by the directional arrow), and no discussion
of disaster mitigation. The CEM approach is considered to be the last of the
“foundational” frameworks upon which more recent disaster frameworks are based
(McEntire 2005).
Contemporary emergency management frameworks. Geis (2000) claims that
“natural disasters” such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and flooding, are often the result of
man tampering with nature, and are therefore not “natural” by design. For example,
coastal and riparian land development in flood zones and hurricane prone areas, and
development on earthquake fault lines are often the sites of natural disasters. Geis’
implication is that if the land was undeveloped, this phenomenon would just be part of
Earth’s natural cycles and not disastrous in consequence. As a means to mitigate natural
disasters, he promotes the idea of the “disaster resistant community” (DRC), as designed
by former FEMA Director James Lee Witt. This proactive policy attempts to preempt
disasters through the use of more effective building codes and land use plans. The DRC
was designed as an “overarching guidance that informs development in hazard prone
areas” (Mileti 1999). Disaster resistant communities also contain adequate community
support systems (police, fire, EMS, transportation infrastructure) for the needs of the
community. While this may seem obvious, the widespread nature of poor planning in
disaster prone areas, such as floodplains and coastal areas signifies our failure to fully
embody this concept to date. The take-away idea that “(a)n appropriately designed built
environment that is sensitive to the natural risk conditions with respect to development
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siting and function, the provision of services, and design and construction will be more
hazard-resistant and less vulnerable than one that is not” bears repeating (Geis 2000).
While there is strength to the disaster resistant EM framework, Figure 3 shows it is
incomplete as its attention is primarily on preparedness with some emphasis on
mitigation (as indicated by the directional arrow) and little to no consideration for
response and recovery. “A DRC represents the safest possible community that we have
the knowledge to design and build in a natural hazard context” (Geis 2000). The
resistance idea infers that a community has been built and designed in an intelligent way
so that natural hazards do not become natural disasters (Geis 2000).
The idea of resistance held strong into the early 1990’s, but attention shifted
towards the idea of community resilience in the latter half of the decade. The disaster
resilience approach encompassed the more comprehensive idea of a community’s ability
to “bounce back” from disaster, rather than only resisting it (Mileti 1999). While
resistance was recognized as an important step towards improved community safety, the
idea was thought to not go far enough in addressing all aspects of disasters. The idea of
resilience shifts the focus towards more than just emergency response or risk
management, but instead towards managing risk on a community by community basis
and creating resilient communities (Britton and Clark 2000). The resilience approach has
taken a particularly strong hold in disaster management in New Zealand (Britton & Clark,
2000; McManus, Seville, Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008). Despite its popularity, there is some
disagreement with the above definition of resilience within the literature. Some scholars
describe the resilience approach as more similar to the idea of hazard mitigation,
management or planning (much like resistance) (Burby, Deyle et al. 2000), while others
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see it emphasizing primarily community post-disaster clean-up efforts (Buckle, Mars et
al. 2000). McManus, Seville, Vargo, and Brunsdon describe resilience as having three
main attributes, “(s)ituation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and
adaptive capacity” (2008). As Figure 3 shows, in this sense the disaster resilience
concept is firmly situated in the recovery and somewhat in the response components of
emergency management.
Out of the context of debate between the resilience and resistance approaches,
comes the idea of sustainable hazards management or sustainability. This approach takes
a broader view and a longer-term perspective in an attempt to correct some of the
weaknesses of the previous approaches (McEntire 2005). In 1987 the Brundtland
Commission introduced the idea that “(s)ustainable development is development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
Mileti recognized that this idea could be extended to incorporate the needs of disaster
planning, shifting the field’s focus still more from “hazard management” to “disaster
management” as the two are not interchangeable (1999). A hazard is not in and of itself a
disaster if undisturbed. A community can function completely normally with hazards in
their midst, if properly managed. The idea of “disaster management” focuses more on
handling situations where hazards result in accidents.
Meo, Ziebro, and Patton describe the application of sustainability to chronic flash
floods in Tulsa, Oklahoma (2004). The Sustainable EM approach looks at longer term
management of hazards, and avoidance of potential disasters. As illustrated in Figure 3,
the Sustainable EM approach emphasizes mitigation and preparedness with known and
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calculable hazards and incorporates some thought into recovery and response plans over
the long term (as indicated by Figure 3’s directional arrows). Through the development of
innovative policy, including bans on floodplain building, floodplain management plans,
and storm water management plans, amongst others, the city of Tulsa was able to take a
longer-term approach to managing its chronic flood problem (Meo, Ziebro et al. 2004).
This new approach dramatically reduced flash floods in Tulsa.
The sustainability approach comes with its own nuanced strengths and
weaknesses as well. As in any other field that the term “sustainability” is applied, there is
still some confusion and lack of clarity as to the functional meaning for sustainability
within the disaster management literature (McEntire and Floyd, 2003). While the
sustainability approach has been utilized extensively in the natural hazards field (floods,
earthquakes, etc.), it hasn’t been used broadly to address human-made or terrorist-related
disasters, specifically those involving EHS (McEntire, 2005). In addition, issues of
environmental health and safety are often not clear-cut or one-dimensional. Actions and
materials helpful in disaster management (such as foams used to fight forest fires) may
have other negative unintended environmental consequences that detract from the
sustainability of their use (Kreimer and Munasinghe, 1991). Overlaying the concept of
sustainability and long-term safety on top of the current political climate of homeland
security and management of immediate risk has also proved challenging, and has reduced
the strength and popularity of this approach.
The final three approaches from the disaster management literature to be
discussed are risk management, homeland security, and vulnerability. Risk management
is a concept used in many circles, principally business and economics along with policy
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development. Much of risk management focuses on the reduction of expected loss from
disaster (McEntire 2005). This approach tries to take the probability of disaster into
account as a part of the decision-making process (Mileti 1999). Risk focuses primarily on
exactly what the name implies, managing risk. While this is a critical component to
preparing for disaster, a critique of this approach is that it doesn’t focus enough on
mitigation or post-disaster plans. In addition, risk management is built upon calculated
probabilities of risk, which are not always accurate representations of reality, nor always
calculable. How do we calculate the probability of a “worst case scenario” such as the
catastrophic typhoon and subsequent nuclear meltdown in Japan? One additional problem
with the risk management approach is its overemphasis on the probability of events at the
cost of losing focus on the consequences of events (Alexander 2002). This minimizes
the actual discussion about processes for managing disasters and their aftermath.
Homeland security is a prevailing disaster management approach today due to the
fear of terrorist attack on American soil. The terrorist attacks of 2001 changed American
policy makers attitude from one of we’re “safe at home” to one of “constant vigilance.”
This cultural shift is reflected in our emergency management policy and practice by
shifting resources towards control of geographic borders, infrastructure protection, and
attention towards our emergency response capabilities (McEntire 2005). This
attentiveness towards securing and protecting our “homeland” has improved preventative
and proactive efforts, hazard reduction activity, and renewed efforts securing our
transportation infrastructure and port safety (Helmick 2008). While these shifts have been
beneficial to these aspects of disaster management, they have focused exclusively on
issues of terrorism, directing our limited emergency response resources on one area, to
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the detriment of other types of disasters (i.e. earthquakes, tornadoes, forest fires, etc.)
(Waugh 2004). This downplays not only the risk of natural hazards, but also trivializes
the associated experts in these areas in matters of disaster management. The homeland
security approach also minimizes some of the hard won hallmarks of emergency
management of the last 20 years, such as cooperation, collaboration, and transparency, in
favor of secrecy and top-down heavy-handed authoritative control (Waugh 2003).
As emergency managers, LEPCs are expected to be attentive to all four functional
areas of EM, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. A 2007 Working Group
developed the following seven principles of EM. Blanchard et al. (2007) stated that
emergency management must be:
1.

Comprehensive

2.

Progressive

3.

Risk-driven

4.

Integrated

5.

Collaborative

6.

Flexible

7.

Professional

The vulnerability management approach has been heralded as a more “holistic,
integrated, and balanced approach to disasters” than the previous piecemeal styles
(McEntire 2005). McEntire also states that vulnerability management includes
components of the risk, resistance, and resilience approaches by “work[ing] toward the
reduction of risk and susceptibility while also raising our resistance and resilience to
disaster” (2004). McEntire argues that when looked at on total, much of the disaster
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research offers an unexpected measure of justification for a vulnerability management
approach (2004). However, comprehensive vulnerability management is not inclusive of
mitigation in its approach. As illustrated in Figure 3, this approach emphasizes the
preparedness and response components of emergency management with less emphasis on
recovery (as indicated by the directional arrow in Figure 3).
Disaster management literature helps to set the historical context within which
LEPCs and other emergency planners are functioning in the U.S. Important as this field
is, the primary focus is still on disaster preparedness and response/ recovery. It is possible
to redesign the diagram in Figure 3 and re-examine the focused attention of LEPC
activity in a different light. Figure 4 below again shows the four functional areas of
emergency management, and the relationship between each.

Figure 4. Functional Areas of Emergency Management and Precaution
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Figure 4 illustrates that there is a relationship between each of the four areas of functional
emergency management. The top two areas of the diagram, “Mitigation” and
“Preparedness” include activities that occur prior to an accident, while “Recovery” and
“Response” occur after an accident has happened. The curvilinear lines represent the fact
that emergency management is a continuous cycle, each step following the next. As
described above in the discussion on emergency management approaches, the majority of
emergency management resources and capacity are currently directed towards
preparedness, recovery, and response activities, and less so towards mitigation activities.
Precaution is included in the Mitigation area, as concepts discussed in this study inclusive
under the heading of “Precaution” or “Inherent safety” are activities that would work to
actually mitigate and/or eliminate hazards, rather than prepare for them.
Informational Regulation
The response for any hazardous event, intentional or accidental, would be first
and primarily local (Gablehouse 2005). It is for this reason that local communities need
to evaluate and be aware of risks. In addition, because any chemical accident has the
potential to get out of control, and due to the human limitations of first responders in
even the best communities, it is useful to look at accident prevention as an important
component of risk management. The more serious a prospective accident is, the greater
it’s potential to overwhelm first responders. LEPCs that are in a higher risk areas, either
with greater quantity or more hazardous chemicals (e.g. combustibility, corrosiveness,
etc.) present or those with larger populations, are hypothesized to be more likely to use a
more proactive approach in response to this increased vulnerability.
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An explicit responsibility of LEPCs is to develop and practice evacuation and
emergency response plans. However, previous studies have noted that these plans are not
adequately communicated to the public, and are only practiced annually. Even when
emergency plans are practiced, it is difficult to simulate the extent and comprehensiveness of a full-scale disaster. Many events in a full-scale disaster are simply unknowable
until the situation is at hand (Torno and Aiken County Emergency Services: Hazardous
Materials Team 2006). This is further complicated from the fact that a large number of
hazardous chemical events occur on highways as transportation accidents. One study
noted that nearly 50% of accidents in Chester County, Pennsylvania occurred as fuel or
other EHS spills on highways between 1987 and 1999 (Shorten et al., 2002).
In addition, research indicates EHS accidents are underreported (Shorten et al.,
2002; Wendt et al., 1996). Wendt et al.’s (1996) study showed that when comparing
results from three different reporting systems (EPA, Department of Transportation
[DOT], and a state-run hazardous reporting system), the state-based system reported a
greater number of incidents than either of the two Federal data collection systems. This
was confirmed by another study in Canada, which found only 3 of 140 transportation
accidents involving EHS present across multiple Canadian tracking databases (Trepanier,
Leroux, & de Marcellis-Warin, 2007).
Besides basic lack of tracking of accidents, EPCRA only requires the reporting
and collection of data from larger companies with substantial quantities of EHS. Many
smaller “Mom and Pop” type facilities and industries are exempt from reporting
requirements, and therefore function “under the radar” of government oversight. The
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underrepresentation of what may not be an insignificant EHS hazard provides a
substantial challenge to and limitation of emergency planning and disaster response.
LEPCs were implemented with stakeholder participation to increase community
awareness of hazardous chemicals, with the intention that community awareness and
increased knowledge would indirectly regulate local chemical usage. There is limited
evidence that information disclosure to the public concerning local chemical releases is a
successful strategy to improve chemical facility environmental performance (Graham and
Miller 2001; Bierle 2003). This research suggests that there has been some mild success
on the part of emergency planners in providing information to the public, and that as a
result, firms have reduced the quantities of hazardous materials on-site, and by extension
their emissions (Wolf, 1996). It was suggested that provision of information to the public
through Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and TRI information was “regulation by
embarrassment” (Regan, 1993, p.34). Information requests from local industry officials,
community or the media may therefore encourage regulatory compliance and proactivity
on the part of industry and by emergency planning agencies.
Alternatively, there is much to suggest that community education or awareness is
a priority not strongly acted upon by emergency planners. In one study, respondents
stated that community awareness efforts were an area of less emphasis than technical and
planning efforts (Rich, Conn et al. 1993). Other research shows that community right-toknow practices are just not a priority of LEPCs (Conn, Owens et al. 1990; Rest, Krimsky
et al. 1991; Lindell and Perry 2001) or are completely disregarded (Conn, Owens et al.
1990; Adams, Burns et al. 1994; Starik, Adams et al. 2000). Consistently, it seems that
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despite the regulatory intent, much of emergency planners’ limited resources are not used
to inform the public.
Alternatively, LEPCs can highlight the interdependence between the chemical
facility and local residents in the community, who include the first responders. This
interdependence can ideally lead to all parties focusing on accident prevention, through
"inventory reduction and control, appropriate maintenance schedules, employee training
on the safe handling of ...chemicals, safer storage, spill containment techniques, and
improved facility security...[in addition to] dealing with process change and materials
substitution" (Gablehouse 2005). Gablehouse (2005) also states that attitudes are more
important than dollars, when it comes to most of these changes. If the community expects
accident prevention to be a priority, facilities will give it more attention.
Due to the unpredictability of chemical emergencies, Gablehouse (2005) notes
that in Colorado the emphasis has shifted to accident prevention, through a series of steps
and communications with local chemical facilities. As members of local communities,
LEPC members are stakeholders in the welfare of the region. Their concerns, according
to Gablehouse, "mirror their community's concerns with facilities handling chemicals"
(2005). Whitney and Lindell, on the other hand, state that LEPC resources in Michigan
are spent mainly on plans to address and mitigate accidents when they occur (2000), not
in preventing them.
In western Pennsylvania, Bowser (2009) found a positive correlation between
increasing city size and allocation of emergency management resources. In addition,
managers of larger cities perceived terrorism as a more serious threat than smaller ones,
and also exercised their emergency plan(s) more frequently, according to the study.
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Funding opportunities and restrictions were cited as a source of frustration amongst cities
of all sizes in the investigation (Bowser, 2009).
Variation between LEPCs and between states may be due to a variety of factors,
some of which have been elucidated through previous research. “…[S]tudies have shown
substantial variation within and between states in the levels of local planning for
hazardous materials emergencies” (Lindell and Meier 1994). Lindell and Meier (1994)
describe “local planning” as activities that work towards meeting mandated requirements
(i.e., compliance). Under EPCRA, all LEPCs are required to meet the same explicit
requirements, but can decide locally how they are going to go about implementing them.
Despite variation in implementation methods, the end results to meet compliance are
consistent nationally.
Organizational Theory and LEPC Effectiveness
In order to comply with the regulatory framework within which they work,
LEPCs need to be effective at what they do. LEPC effectiveness is a nebulous measure to
operationalize and quantify, and has been seen handled in several different ways in the
literature. The idea of effectiveness and its importance to the implementation of EPCRA
will be discussed. Previous national studies of LEPCs have examined LEPC compliance
and proactivity. Nationwide, LEPCs seem to be lacking in provision of information to the
public, despite their intended policy goal of providing community right-to-know
information (Adams et al., 2000; Starik et al., 2008).
In Michigan, a series of internal and external factors have been named as related
to successful emergency planning outcomes (Lindell & Meier, 1994). Successful
emergency planning outcomes include the submission of an emergency plan and
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completion of critical planning tasks as outlined by state emergency planning law.
Crucial factors towards this include member inputs, staffing and organizational structure,
and resources available to members as internally important factors, and support of the
community and recent hazard management experience as externally important factors.
Other researchers have found workplace climate as central to successful
organizational outcomes (Lindell and Brandt 2000); Kopelman et al., 1990; (Lindell and
Whitney 1995). Within an organizational setting, climate has also been correlated with
technological updating and overall performance (Kozlowski and Hults 1987), along with
accident prevention and safety program effectiveness (Zohar 1980). Climate quality
within an organization was also significantly correlated with organizational antecedents
and outcomes (Lindell and Brandt 2000). While each of these studies showed important
contributions to understanding LEPC organizational function, they did not address
LEPCs role in informing the public, or acting proactively to reduce hazard vulnerability.
The concept of effectiveness is at the core of much of the research on LEPCs.
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term “effective” as “producing a decided,
decisive, or desired effect” (2010). A review of the literature shows effectiveness defined
in the following ways. Each of these concepts is an important component of LEPCs
function within their community.
The literature points towards several factors that have been documented as
influencing the effectiveness of LEPCs. Effectiveness has been defined skeletally in
previous models as simply the submission of an emergency plan by the LEPC (Whitney
&Lindell, 2000). Submitting an emergency plan is one of the primary functions given to
LEPC under EPCRA. This research asserts further that proactivity is also a component of
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effectiveness. For an LEPC to be “effective”, it must meet both the criteria for
“compliance” and “proactivity” as conceptualized below.
Lindell and Meier (1994) used literature from three fields to develop their
definition of LEPC effectiveness: disaster planning, strategic planning, and team
effectiveness. Strategic planning theory states that an organization’s external and internal
environment work in tandem with the group’s values to impact the entire process through
which priorities are agreed upon and strategic choices are made about how to reach the
organization’s goals (Bryson and Roering, 1987). These priorities therefore lead to an
effective group. This includes much of the internal dynamics that influence group
decision making, but seems to leave out some of the external forces that may differently
impact team members.
Effectiveness is also equated with and made “measurable” by other researchers
through analysis of emergency planning outcomes, the most objective of which is the
submission and approval (by SERC) of a site-specific emergency response plan. Lindell
and Perry (1990), however, state that submission of a plan is, in and of itself, not enough
to indicate an effective LEPC or a prepared community, but can be seen as an important
indicator of emergency preparedness. As noted earlier, additional emergency planning
outcomes include completion of emergency planning drills, and work with industry and
the community towards vulnerability reduction and sustainability. This research asserts
that additional “tangible” extras, such as promotion of inherent safety and hazard
reduction concepts are also measurable emergency planning outcomes. Lindell and Perry
make important strides towards a well-operationalized definition of effectiveness.
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Lindell and Whitney (1995) refer to what they call LEPC team climate, defined as
“members perceptions of team tasks and conditions”, along with the support of state
emergency planning resources, as among the most important factors in the effectiveness
of LEPCs. This research suggests that LEPC members’ personal experience of
membership within the LEPC is an important component of the success of the
organization. It also suggests that LEPCs that make better use of state emergency
planning resources are more effective. As a continuation of this, interaction with Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other knowledgeable Federal or State
authorities may also improve activity and or proactiveness of emergency planning
organizations.
Lindell and Whitney (1995) also found membership in regional LEPC
Associations, previous experience managing an emergency, and the use of automated
technology influenced successful emergency planning outcomes. Later research found
that institutional capacity (revenue, organizational efficiency and member activity level)
also influenced the effectiveness of LEPCs (Whitney and Lindell 2000).
In 2000, Whitney and Lindell also suggest that as LEPCs are primarily volunteerrun organizations, organizational commitment or member motivation need also be
examined in order to understand the drivers of participation. Having participating
members is an essential component of an effective LEPC. In their study they found that
organizational commitment comes in part from organizational goal identification.
Participating in an organization that has clearly established goals improves member
organizational commitment. In addition, Whitney and Lindell (2000) found that three
types of leader behavior facilitate goal identification: leader consideration, leader

43

communication, and leader-initiating structure. Leadership within the organization
appears to play an important role in organizational effectiveness. Finally, members’
commitment to the LEPC is also theorized to be increased by their belief that the
organization can accomplish its set goals. Social learning theory states that when
individuals believe they can accomplish a goal, it actually increases their ability to do so
(Locke & Latham, 2002). In other words, perception of competence increases
organizational commitment.
Importance of decision-making to effectiveness. In addition to these factors, in
order to understand how the effectiveness of an LEPC develops, I will introduce the
concept of “framing”. According to Beach and Connolly (2005), a frame is “a mental
construct consisting of elements, and the relationship among them, that are associated
with a situation that is of interest to a decision maker,” in other words; it is the decision
maker’s interpretation of the context surrounding the decision. How LEPC members
frame events; how their experience and history influences their work together as a group,
may be important in their effectiveness.
For example, expert chess players, when presented with a chess board with pieces
in reasonable locations from an ongoing chess game, can remember the locations upon
removal of the pieces, and can accurately predict what moves might occur two to three
steps ahead in the game. Novices, presented with the same scenario, can neither
remember game piece locations on a game board, nor anticipate future moves. If other
types of experts are similar to chess experts, they also may be able to “recognize
meaningful patterns of events, and having recognized (framed) them can use them to
perform the tasks that the situation demands” (Beach and Connolly 2005).
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In an LEPC, expertise can be developed through several means, including past
experience, education, and training. Fischer defines an expert as “someone with mastery
over a body of knowledge and its relevant techniques” (2003). An LEPC with actual
experience or expertise in handling an emergency, and/or with more extensive training
may be better equipped to handle the demands of an emergency than an inexperienced,
less-trained LEPC. This type of knowledge would likely be similar in LEPCs nationwide,
as there is no reason to think that some portions of the country are better educated than
others. There is generally a mix of expert and non-expert individuals located throughout
the U.S.
In addition to the influence of expertise, a frame is also a particular way of
constructing a worldview. The development of frames by individual LEPC members does
not occur in a vacuum. Each member develops their frame for handling risk within the
context of the group, so there is a shared frame amongst the members. Members “align”
their frames through discussion and dialogue (Beach and Connolly 2005). Each LEPC
also develops its frame within the context of the local and broader society and culture
within which it is rooted (Trice and Beyer 1993). This shared culture is more subtle in its
impact on group members, but equally important. The “framing” factors of expertise,
education, training, and local context and culture may also be important in the
effectiveness of LEPCs.
The area of LEPC effectiveness has been thoroughly studied, particularly by
Whitney, Lindell, and Meier, and others, and contributes substantially to the
understanding of the internal dynamics and characteristics of emergency planning
organizations, including LEPCs. These internal dynamics are an important contributor to
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the actions and measurable outcomes of LEPCs. Other factors also play a role, however.
Emergency planning is a constantly evolving field in a rapidly changing, fast-paced 21st
century culture. A wide variety of external pressures, including increased demands and in
some cases decreased funding, are placed upon present day LEPCs and emergency
management agencies. Under EPCRA, LEPCs were initially expected to manage EHS
disasters. As necessity has required, they are also a part of the primary response network
for natural disasters, and most recently, homeland security or terrorist threats. The
convenience of the network of first responders threaded from county to county has made
these emergency management networks an ideal first line of communication and defense.
Similar to public schools, fire and police services, LEPCs are experiencing
increased expectations in what is a difficult-to-quantify field. LEPCs have their original
responsibilities concerning gathering and promulgation of public EHS information, along
with emergency planning. In addition, LEPCs have the relatively newly added
responsibility of community terrorism/ accident preparation. There are serious, legitimate
concerns about hazardous substance potential threat as weapons, and LEPCs have been
saddled with the expectation of managing this threat, without much or any additional
funding.
Funding problems are paramount in emergency planning organizations. It is
possible to tabulate the number of accidents responded to, but not the number of
accidents averted. Without numbers to back up these “invisible” successes, it is difficult
to justify requests for additional funds from localities. Even where emergency planners
can justify more funds, the money is simply unavailable in a lot of cases. Functioning
with high expectations and limited capacity has been a problem since the advent of
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LEPCs in 1987. In addition to resource strains, there are philosophical differences about
the “best” allocation of those limited funds in the disaster management literature. In the
practitioner studies, most LEPCs are noted to have extremely limited funds, so funding is
considered a systemic problem.
Compliance and Proactivity
In addition to being more-or-less effective, LEPCs may also be more-or-less
proactive in their actions. The active development and use of proactive or precautionary
measures is a means of reducing inherent levels of hazard in the chemical industry, and
therefore inherently reducing hazard in local communities. The development of the
“precautionary principle,” and the concept of “inherent safety” are indicators of a
proactive approach to EM. LEPCs that are more proactive may use precaution as a
guiding principle for chemical safety and emergency planning. Precaution as a guiding
principle in decision-making is a critical area of emerging research in the areas of
chemical safety and emergency management.
Statistically, normal accidents due to operator or machine error at facilities
manufacturing, using, or storing hazardous chemicals are unavoidable (Perrow 1984).
Due to the risk of normal accidents and the threat of deliberate attacks on chemical
facilities, a movement towards the creation of safer and more secure facilities has been
underway. This includes the increased use of safety controls (automatic shutoffs, alarms,
etc.) and site security (guards, fences, etc.) along with inherently safer technologies
(substitution of safer chemicals, lower temperature or pressure, limitation of impact by
changing design or process conditions, and less material stored on site or materials stored
in a safer form [liquid vs. gas] (Mannan, Rogers et al., 2003). The use of these
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technologies is also a way for companies to stay ahead of the regulatory curve and reduce
their liability by reducing on-site accident potential (Ashford and Zwetsloot 2000).
Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1999
In 1994 the National Environmental Law Center (NELC) found that of 11 LEPCs
surveyed in Great Lakes states, only 3 were promoting hazard reduction as a part of their
emergency management plan (Stone, Gray et al. 1995). In total, four out of the eleven
LEPCs were aware of the concepts “primary prevention” or “inherent safety” (Stone,
Gray et al. 1995). The LEPCs promoting hazard reduction were surprisingly not those in
counties with the highest number of chemical accidents. It is expected that the promotion
of hazard reduction, or proactive steps, will have increased substantially more than 15
years after the implementation of the NELC survey.
The definition and operationalization of the terms “compliance” and “proactivity”
are key to this research. There is a fair amount of writing on “organizational compliance”
in the literature. This thread is primarily with regard to “organizational citizenship
behaviors (OCBs), and can be traced back to Bateman, Smith, Organ & Near (Bateman
and Organ 1983; Smith, Organ et al. 1983). This idea can be extrapolated back further to
Chester Barnard’s “willingness to cooperate” (Barnard 1938). I have briefly summarized
and noted this to emphasize that this is not the definition of compliance or organizational
compliance that I am using for the purposes of this research. While this is a valid and
useful definition of compliance, I have used a far more simple and explicit definition of
compliance. Compliance, for the purposes of this research, as used by Adams et al.
(1994), Starik et al. (2000), and Templeton and Kirk (2008), is substantively defined as

48

meeting the objectives for LEPCs as outlined by SARA III. These objectives are
explicitly stated in Table 1 (in Chapter 1) of this dissertation.
Similarly, the term “proactivity” has been used in the literature to indicate entities
that are acting in an anticipatory or advance-acting capacity. It may include taking
additional steps above and beyond those required in preparation or expectation of a future
event or situation. This general idea has again been used by others studying LEPCs
including Adams et al. (1994), Starik et al. (2000), and Templeton and Kirk (2008) to
indicate a series of specific actions LEPCs may take above and beyond their statutory
requirements, which might help better prepare these areas for future disasters. The criteria
being defined as “proactive” are listed as factors in the right-hand side of Table 1 (in
Chapter 1). These proactivity factors encapsulate activities engaged in by LEPCs that are
“above and beyond” the basic LEPC obligations and further promote community
chemical safety through various measures.
There may also be a “personal disposition towards proactive behavior” amongst
members of more proactive LEPCs (Bateman & Crant, 1993, p.103). As stated by Lewin
(1938), all behavior originates from both personal and situational sources. Many factors
have been loosely linked to proactive behavior on the part of individuals. Of course,
organizations are made up of individuals, and individual behavior matters. Bateman and
Crant (1993, p.103) also noted that “need for achievement …dominance” and other
leadership qualities were correlated with more proactive behavior amongst students.
Parker, Williams, and Turner (2006, p.636) state that proactive ideas and problem solving
amongst wire makers was significantly associated with “role breadth self-efficacy,
flexible role orientation, job autonomy,” and coworker trust. So the conditions
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experienced by LEPC members, along with their personal traits, may influence their
tendency towards more proactive action. This is an important avenue for further research.
This dissertation includes an examination of the relationship between external or
structural characteristics and LEPC actions. Much of the literature on LEPCs focuses on
psychological or organizational characteristics within the organization. I am interested in
pursuing a different focus with my research agenda. I am investigating a relationship
between structural characteristics and factors comprising indices for LEPC compliance
and proactivity. The results of this research on LEPCs will provide insight into
characteristics about external influences on organizational function and may also be
generalizable to similarly structured organizations.
A Note on Theory
Portions of this dissertation may be considered to be a-theoretical. While it is
based on a thorough review of the literature and discussions with experts, much of the
theory is to be induced from the data, itself. There are at least two schools of thought
when it comes to the relationship between theory and empirical research in the social
sciences (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000). There is a more inductive approach
to research and a more deductive approach. The deductive approach begins with a theory
and then creates a hypothesis to test that theory. The inductive approach, the one to be
used in this study, begins with an observation and pattern recognition and works its way
up towards theory development. Induction is a more “bottom up” approach and involves
the development of tentative hypotheses that can be tested and repeated to potentially
form new theories.
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The first deductive approach was put forward by Karl Popper (1968) and can be
described as a theory before research approach (Popper 1968). This process of
falsification can be summarized in the following five steps (Reynolds 1971):
1.

Development of a theory or model.

2.

Choice of an assertion derived from the theory to investigate.

3.

Test the assertion empirically through research.

4.

Use theory to examine empirical data. If the assertion is rejected by the
data, re-evaluate the theory and start again.

5.

If the assertion is not rejected by the data, work to improve the theory or
test anew assertion.

The second school of thought, as advocated by Robert Merton, can be described as the
research before theory approach (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000). Merton (1968) states:
It is my central thesis that empirical research goes far beyond the passive
role of verifying and testing theory; it does more than confirm or refute
hypotheses. Research plays an active role: it performs at least four major
functions that help shape the development of theory. It initiates,
reformulates, it deflects, and it clarifies theory.
The research before theory approach involves the following four steps in its process
(Reynolds 1971):
1.

Study of a phenomenon and its characteristics.

2.

Detailed measurement of the characteristics (data collection) and how they
fluctuate.

3.

Analysis of the data, looking for systematic patterns.

4.

Use the patterns to develop a theory about the phenomenon.
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The research of this dissertation is more reflective of Merton’s strategy than of
Popper’s. While it is based in the theory and work of other scholars, it is not derived
directly from any one school of thought or aligned with one specific theory. Merton’s
justification of theory unfolding organically from the data itself is no less sound
scholarship, when undertaken with thoroughness and clarity. In all likelihood, research is
actually completed in more of a “spiral” or circular manner, where questions lead to
hypothesis testing, which leads to theory development, “new” theories are tested,
amended where necessary, and then the cycle continues (Berg 2001). Rather than
choosing one approach or the other, it may be more a matter of where in the spiral
research process a researcher picks up the intellectual thread.
Questions and Hypotheses
As noted in the literature review, some of the most recent scholarship on LEPCs
has been on compliance and proactivity levels. Three nationwide studies have been
conducted, two by private contractors for the EPA, one by the EPA themselves (Adams et
al., 1994; Starik et al., 2000; USEPA, 2008), looking at a variety of factors, many
pertaining to LEPC compliance with the regulations created from EPCRA, and proactive
actions. Templeton and Kirk (2008) performed a study of LEPC compliance and
proactivity, looking at how these factors are influenced in LEPCs in Virginia. The three
EPA studies focused primarily on tracking and documenting the current activity of
LEPCs nationwide, and on best practices. No statistical analysis was done, as these were
surveys gathering data to inform the agency on current practices in the field. The earlier
two studies, completed for the USEPA, used frequencies and cross-tabulations to show
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that planning areas with larger populations have increased LEPC performance (Adams et
al., 1994; Starik et al., 2000).
The results of the 2008 EPA study stated that “dedicated membership” and
regular meetings were the most important contributors to LEPC success. This study also
showed that the most active LEPCs had responded to an accident in the last five years
and that only 20% of their respondents reported having some sort of operating budget.
Blackwood (2003) studied LEPC performance in relation to activity level,
population size, size of LEPC (number of participating members), presence of subcommittees, funding, and paid staff. Specifically, he found that LEPC activity levels had
actually gone down amongst study participants in Virginia when compared with previous
research. The primary reasons noted for this decline were lower levels of funding,
reduced public participation, and limited organizational structure of LEPCs themselves
(Blackwood, 2003).
Templeton and Kirk (2008) also collected information on the activity and
proactivity levels in Virginia LEPCs. They tested specific hypotheses on the relationship
between the activity and proactivity levels in Virginia LEPCs, and number of facilities,
population size of planning district, type of LEPC (city, county, or joint) respectively,
and the combined influence of these factors. This study used a binary logistic regression
to analyze their hypotheses, with 39% of the activity level variation in their model
explained by number of facilities present in the planning area (R2=.390, p<0.001) and
nearly 36% of the proactivity level variation in their model explained by the same
(R2=.357, p<0.001). They found no statistically significant relationship between activity
and proactivity levels and “perceived effectiveness”. Perceived effectiveness was defined
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in this study as a survey response to whether LEPC members subjectively felt their LEPC
was effective. While this study showed a relationship between activity and proactivity
levels and number of facilities, respectively, it left out other important factors that may be
related. In addition to experience, funding and community characteristics may also play a
role.
The research questions and hypotheses in this dissertation were derived from
careful consideration of the fields discussed above. The compliance and proactivity levels
are established using the indices cited in Table 1 (Chapter 1). Factors included in the
compliance scale are activities that are legislatively required of the LEPC. Factors
included in the proactivity scale are activities that might be considered “above and
beyond” the mandated requirements to ensure chemical safety and security in their
community. LEPC compliance and proactivity’s respective relationship to each of the
independent variables, including the number of chemical facilities reporting to a county’s
LEPC, the urban/rural characterization of the county, the population size of the county,
the accident experience of the LEPC, and whether or not they receive funding for full or
part-time staff will be examined. Each of these variables will be justified below. It is
expected that LEPCs are more compliant or proactive, (i.e., positively related) if they
have:
1.

More regulated facilities in their county

2.

Have a larger county population

3.

Are more urban

4.

Have accident experience within their recent (5-year) history
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This study examines these factors for correlative relationships.
Question 1: What are the levels of compliance and proactivity for LEPCs?
Question 2: Are compliance and proactivity levels correlated with the
number of chemical facilities, population size, metropolitan nature of
community, and/or relative accident experience of LEPC, respectively?
H(1a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs with more regulated
facilities within their jurisdiction.
H(1b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs with more regulated
facilities within their jurisdiction.
Justification: LEPCs responsible for more regulated facilities have more inherent hazard
in their jurisdiction. It seems reasonable to expect that knowledge of large quantities of
hazardous materials would elicit greater concern, and greater attentiveness to compliance
and proactivity actions.
H(2a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs with larger populations
in their jurisdiction.
H(2b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs with larger populations in
their jurisdiction.
Justification: LEPCs in areas with larger populations have more “at stake.” As a pure
numbers game, larger populations are likely more at risk due to densely populated areas.
Any EHS accident that may occur would have greater likelihood of impacting larger
numbers of individuals. It is logical to expect that LEPCs would act to ensure that
emergency plans (compliance) are in place and it is reasonable to think that these LEPCs
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might go above and beyond their expected duties to ensure public safety in areas with
larger populations.
H(3a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs in more metropolitan,
less rural areas.
H(3b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs in more metropolitan, less
rural areas.
Justification: Similar to the rationale for larger populations, LEPCs that include more
metropolitan, less rural areas may have a stronger incentive to be compliant and/or
proactive due to more densely populated areas. Metropolitan areas may have greater
capacity (access to funding and resources) than more rural, isolated areas as well.
H(4a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs with more relative
accident experience.
H(4b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs with more relative
accident experience.
Justification: LEPCs with more accident experience might have learned from their
experience and are therefore more likely to be compliant or proactive based on heuristics.
If an LEPC has dealt with more accidents in its jurisdiction, relative to other LEPCs, they
have first-hand experience of how prepared they are in some accident scenarios (as each
accident will be unique in many factors, e.g. timing, substance involved, location, etc.) It
is reasonable to expect that this first-hand knowledge might inform their actions,
resulting in more compliance with regulatory requirements and more proactive action to
minimize risk to the community.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Chapter III summarizes the methodology used to research Ohio LEPC compliance
and proactivity levels, along with related factors. An initial review of the area of study
will be followed by a discussion of the choice of survey methodology and its application.
This chapter will conclude with a description of the variables, survey instrument, and
analysis methods undertaken. Results and analysis of results will be presented in the
following chapters.
The creation of LEPCs dawned a new era in American emergency planning. The
emphasis on local, participatory decision-making has honed the process of planning and
managing disasters from a rough, patchwork of actors to a more cohesive coordinated
system of local units. The compliance and proactivity of LEPCs are examined in relation
to a compliance-proactivity index developed by Adams et al. (1994) and updated by
Starik et al. (2000). LEPCs were surveyed and demographic data was collected to
characterize basic similarities and differences between LEPC groups. Several factors are
explored specifically in relation to LEPC compliance and proactive behavior: county
population size, characterization of jurisdiction (rural, suburban, urban), number of
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facilities regulated within the county, and number of chemical accidents within the last
five (5) years. Each of these is suggested in the literature as a factor that may affect LEPC
compliance or proactivity. The methodology used for this research is primarily a webbased survey of LEPC members, along with supportive data gathered from the 2010 U.S.
Census.
Research Design
This project essentially captures a “moment in time” and provides descriptive
information along with testing of the research hypotheses for probative causation. The
survey method enabled the researcher to gather information from an accessible
population in a convenient manner. Survey research is noted to be logical, deterministic,
parsimonious, and has specificity (Babbie, 1990). The rapid turnaround and economy of
design are also of great appeal in designing a research project of this nature (Babbie,
1990). In general, web based surveys are considered beneficial for their costeffectiveness and convenience to respondents. Shih and Fan’s (2008) meta-analysis
showed that responses from a web-based survey are similar to survey responses gathered
through traditional mail survey methods with several caveats. According to Shih and Fan
(2008), survey response rates are slightly higher on average in mailed surveys than web
surveys, but this rate varies with follow-up reminders and type of population addressed.
For this study, all respondents were offered the option of a paper survey if the web survey
was not a suitable option.
A cross-sectional Internet-based survey was used to collect information from a
representative member of each of the sampled 87 LEPCs. There is one LEPC in the
sample representing each of Ohio’s 88 counties, with the exception of Montgomery and
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Greene counties, which have combined their planning efforts into one LEPC. Ohio has
been chosen as the sample area for practical reasons of research proximity (access) and as
a convenience sample. All LEPCs within Ohio are subject to the same laws and
regulations under the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) and Ohio
Emergency Management Agency (OEMA). It is reasonable to think that the results of the
research study will be generalizable geographically to LEPCs functioning outside of Ohio
that are demographically similar. The results of this study will be compared to the results
of a previous nationwide study of LEPCs, as a means of assessing similarity or difference
between this sample and the LEPCs in the United States overall and possibly enabling
generalization.
Study Sample and Population
The study population consists of all LEPCs within the United States. There are at
the time of the study more than 3,000 LEPCs listed in the USEPA database. Ohio was
chosen as the location for this study sample for several reasons. Ohio’s geographical
position, bordering the Great Lakes, the largest body of freshwater in the world, makes it
a place of global consequence. In addition, Ohio was also one of the top three states
accounting for TRI releases, along with Texas and Indiana, according to a survey of the
data in 1988 and again in 1999 (Graham and Miller, 2001). These three states account for
a total of nearly 20% of all national releases. Ohio’s high rate of TRI reported releases is
primarily due to large numbers of small to medium sized facilities (around 1,550 facilities
averaging 77,000 pounds of EHS per facility, or a total of approximately 119,350,000)
(Graham and Miller, 2001). The most recent TRI data, from 2010, shows Ohio ranking
fourth highest amongst all states nationally in TRI releases, with a total chemical release
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(including on-site and off-site disposals and releases) of 159,028,131 pounds of EHS
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2010) The top three highest chemical
release states in 2010, according to TRI data, were Nevada (479,873,201 lbs. released),
Utah (213,963,676 lbs. released), and Texas (209,685,795 lbs. released). So although
Ohio is ranked lower nationally, the total number of pounds of chemicals released has
increased within the last ten years.
All LEPCs within Ohio are accountable to the same state government bodies: the
Ohio State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), the Ohio Emergency
Management Agency (OEMA) and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA).
This ensures some measure of “control” over the expectations and framework within
which all LEPCs in the study are functioning. The variation from state to state with
implementation of EPCRA is not unimportant, but is in general not of consequence to the
characteristics being examined in this study. In general, one of the main implementation
differences is the scale of each LEPCs jurisdiction LEPCS are organized by county in
many states, but in others they are by metropolitan area or other designation.
The survey involved contacting representatives of each of Ohio’s LEPCs at the
time of the study. The sample of LEPCs included in the study was a convenience or
purposive sample. LEPC members include representatives from the following groups and
organizations: elected state and local officials; law enforcement personnel; emergency
management personnel; firefighting personnel; first aid personnel; hospital personnel;
health personnel; local environmental personnel; transportation personnel; broadcast
and/or print media personnel; community groups; and owners and operators of subject
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facilities. SERC appoints LEPC members to two-year terms of office, with opportunity to
serve multiple terms.
The USEPA LEPC database, available on the USEPA website, was used as a
sampling frame for the LEPC population. Each LEPC was contacted by phone using the
name and number listed in the USEPA public database. A second, and for some, third
round of phone calls was conducted before the name/ contact information of the best
and/or current contact was found (frequently either the Information Officer or the LEPC
Chairperson). Contact information (email address, phone number, knowledgeable
respondent name) was confirmed during these phone conversations. All individuals
contacted reported having access to email and the Internet at the time of the study, and all
but one LEPC contacted agreed verbally that they would participate in the study once
contacted with the materials. Participants were asked whether a web-based survey would
prove problematic, but all agreed that they had adequate Internet access and would
respond electronically, so no alternative means of survey implementation was necessary.
In total 58 LEPCs responded and completed the online survey out of the original 87
LEPCs that were sent surveys. This gives a sample response rate of 67% of the original
sample.
Validity and Generalizability
External validity is related to the generalizability of the study’s findings. A
grounded theory approach was used to study a sample of LEPCs. Strauss and Corbin
(1984) articulate the term theory as “a plausible relationship among concepts and sets of
concepts,” as interpreted by Creswell (1998, p.56). Shadish, Cook, and Campbell’s
grounded theory of causal generalization was used (2002). Shadish, Cook, and Campbell
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recommend closely adhering to five principles in order to make appropriate causal
generalizations. These principles are used to control for construct validity and external
validity when looking for probative causal connections. Shadish et al.’s (2002) principles
are included below in Table 3.
Table 3.
Principles to control for validity when looking for probative causal connections

List of Principles
1.

Surface similarity

2.

Ruling out irrelevancies

3.

Making discriminations

4.

Interpolation and extrapolation

5.

Causal explanation

Shadish, Cook, & Campbell (2002)
Each of the concepts included in Table 3 will be explained in detail, as they are important
to the design of this study. The purposive or convenience sample used for this project is
“not backed by statistical logic that justifies formal generalizations, even though [it]…is
more practical than formal probability sampling” (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p.
356). The theory of generalized causal inference allows for a logic for probative causal
research based upon what scientists actually do. The concept of Surface Similarity
includes the use of Campbell’s Principle of Proximal Similarity, which states that causal
relationships found in one circumstance or situation are generalizable to another
circumstance or situation that is similar on selected distinguishable features. Overall, the
principle of Surface Similarity is an examination of the target of the study in comparison
to the target of generalization, assessing for similarities (Shadish, et al., 2002). In this
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case, the target of study, LEPCs in Ohio can be compared to the target of generalization,
LEPCs in the United States. LEPCs throughout the U.S. were created using the same
federal mandate (EPCRA) and are all expected to meet the same goals, regardless of their
geographic location. They have a surface similarity in both their structure and function.
Variations in geographic region, such as population density and hazards, also vary
throughout the sample area.
Shadish et al.’s second principle of generalized causal inference, Ruling Out
Irrelevancies, looks to distinguish any construct or variation that is irrelevant to the
subject under study (2002). This principle looks for information that may differ between
the study group and the group being generalized to, which is unimportant to the concepts
and attributes being examined. The real differences that do exist between Ohio and other
parts of the United States, may be of little consequence to this study. Irrelevant
differences are discounted, as dealing with a hazardous chemical spill in a large city in
Nebraska is likely similar in most ways to dealing with a hazardous chemical spill in a
large city in Ohio.
The third principle, Making Discriminations, distinguishes features that may limit
generalizability. Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) argument states that any new construct is
created with its author already having in mind how it differs from previous constructs.
The very act of definition implies that one is creating distinctions, which must be verified
(Shadish et al., 2002). The sample is within the boundaries of the state lines of Ohio, and
there may indeed be some differences with the implementation of emergency planning
and management methodologies in Ohio that are not consistent with other parts of the
country. Hawaii or Alaska, for instance, may have unique circumstances to which the
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generalizability of this study would not apply. Being an island state or a remotely located
one may bring about unique circumstances that would not be seen in response to EHS
emergencies in the continental United States.
The last two principles comprising the theory of generalized causal inference are
interpolation and extrapolation, and causal explanation. The fourth principle,
interpolation and extrapolation refers to generalizing “by interpolating to unsampled
values within range of sampled… [items] and by extrapolation beyond sampled range”
(Shadish et al., 2002, p.358). This principle states that frequently research includes
external validity inferences and infers values between gathered data points, and above
and below the observed range of data points for sampled values of a construct.
Finally, Shadish et al.’s (2002) fifth principle involves the generation and testing
of theories about the target of generalization. This causal explanation can refer to deep
similarity, or similarities not seen at the surface. An example of this might be an
examination of heart attacks in humans. Women and men are now known to show very
different symptoms during a cardiac event, but the internal problem is the same; a heart in
distress due to inadequate blood supply. On the surface, a woman with stomach pains,
shoulder blade pain, exhaustion may seem to have a very different problem than a man
with gripping chest pains and left arm pain, however the “deep similarity” is the true
cause of both instances. Causal explanation is an important contributor to construct
validity and external validity. In this study, causal explanation will include careful
examination of all data in multiple ways, multiple times. Examination of demographics,
cross-tabulations, and correlations, in addition to logical, rational examination of the data
are core components of searching for “deep similarity” between sample data and related
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studies. By following these general guiding principles of probative causal inference,
careful examination of this sample data can be completed with a non-probability,
convenience sample.
The survey data was collected to characterize the population of LEPC’s
location(s) on compliance-proactivity indices (located in Table 1, Chapter 1). The terms
compliance and proactivity are described in detail and examined in the context of their
use by other researchers in Chapter II of this dissertation). An index is a combination of
empirical variables used to represent the phenomenological abstract concept of interest
(Bowen & Bowen, 1999).
The factors included in the Compliance Index are those required by SERC under
SARA Title III as responsibilities of LEPCs, and therefore indicate compliance with
SARA Title III’s requirements. They are listed again in Table 4 below.
Table 4.
Compliance Index Factors
List of Compliance Index Factors (derived from SARA Title III)
Have a chairperson
Have a community emergency coordinator
Have an information coordinator
Hold regular meetings
Advertise meetings to the public
Develop an emergency response plan (ERP)
Submit ERP to the SERC
Publish newspaper notice about availability of ERP
Review ERP within last year
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These factors are shown in no particular order, but will be combined additively with
uniform weights to give each LEPC a Compliance “score”, assuming we operationalize
“Compliance” explicitly as the Ohio SERC’s requirements of LEPCs as completing the
above. In theory the compliance score may vary from zero, if the LEPC has not fulfilled
any of the requirement, to nine, if it has fulfilled all of them. Similarly, the factors
included in the Proactivity Index will be combined to yield a Proactivity “score” for each
participating LEPC. The term proactivity is used to describe some of the activities that
an LEPC might undertake that go above and beyond the requirements to achieve
compliance. Completion of these items is the operationalized definition of proactivity for
the purposes of this research. The proactivity factors are listed in Table 5 below.
Table 5.
Proactivity Index Factors
List of Proactivity Index Factors
Meet quarterly or more often
Report making informed hazard reduction, accident prevention, or pollution
prevention recommendations to industry/ local government
Update ERP within the past year
Practice ERP within the past year
Incorporate proactive language into LEPC mission.

The Proactivity score was constructed similarly to the compliance score. In theory the
Proactivity score may vary from one, if the LEPC has not fulfilled any of the
requirements, to five, if it has fulfilled all of them.
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LEPC Survey Instrument
The survey itself is comprised of questions extracted from previously published
LEPC surveys used by Lindell and Brandt (2000) and Starik et al. (2000) along with
original questions. The survey instrument in its entirety can be seen in Appendix B.
Lindell and Brandt (2000) survey was originally developed to study LEPCs in Michigan.
The Starik et al. (2000) survey was a national survey of LEPCs in the United States
commissioned by the EPA. As stated above, many of the survey components used by
Lindell and Brandt were also derived in part, from previous surveys published in the
literature (2000).
Table 6 shows the relationship between the variables, research hypotheses, and
survey questions. It is expected that the independent variables will all serve to positively
influence both dependent variables (individually and collectively).
That is to say, it is expected that the more chemical accidents within an LEPC’s
jurisdiction, the larger the population size, the more urban (as compared to more rural),
and the more chemical facilities functioning within a county, the higher the LEPC’s
respective Compliance and Proactivity scores will be. Each of these is hypothesized to
independently impact the scores positively, along with an aggregate effect. The survey
was divided into several sections, including the following:
Contact information
About your locality
About LEPC Meetings
About LEPC Members
About LEPC Activities
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Table 6.
Variables, Research Questions, and Survey Items
Associated
Dependent/Independent

Associated

Variable

Concepts theorized to influence LEPC Compliance

Dependent Variable:

* chairperson

LEPC Compliance Score

*community emer. coordinator

Hypothesis

Survey
Literature Source

Question(s)
Q. 7

N/A

Q. 10
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*information coordinator

Q. 10

*regular meetings

Q. 11

*advertise meetings publicly

Starik et al, 2000

Q. 17

*develop ERP

Q. 14

*submit ERP to SERC

Q. 15

*Public notice of ERP

Q. 17

*Review plan w/in last year

Q. 14

Templeton & Kirk,
Independent Variable:

Number of chemical facilities within LEPC jurisdiction

H1(a)

2008

Q.21

Dependent/Independent
Variable

Associated
Concepts theorized to influence LEPC Compliance

Hypothesis

Assc Survey
Literature Source

Question

Adams et al., 1994,
Independent Variable:

Population size of jurisdiction

H2(a)

Starik et al. 2000

Q.2

Lindell & Perry,
Independent Variable:

Relative accident experience of LEPC

H4(a)

2001

Q.19

Quarterly meetings

N/A

Starik et al, 2000

Q. 11

Dependent Variable:
LEPC Proactivity Score
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Make hazard rdxn recommendations

Q. 24

Update plan w/in last year

Q. 14

Practice plan w/in last year

Q. 18

Proactive language in Mission Statement

Templeton & Kirk,

Independent Variable:

Number of chemical facilities within LEPC jurisdiction

H1(b)

2008

Q. 21

Independent Variable:

Population size of jurisdiction

H2(b)

Adams et al., 1994,

Q. 2

Independent Variable

Urbanization of jurisdiction

H3(b)

Starik et al. 2000

Q. 3

Independent Variable

Relative accident experience of LEPC

H4(b)

Lindell & Perry,
2001

Q.19

Generally, this survey gathered data about each LEPC’s activity and proactive
efforts established using the criteria listed in Table 1, factors discussed in the literature
review, and the conceptual framework. A total of thirty-five (35) items were presented
on the questionnaire. A number of these asked for descriptive, categorical, or nominal
information about the LEPC, some were objective “yes” or “no” questions about the
LEPCs actions, and a few were Likert-type questions. An example of a Likert scale
question included is: “How familiar are you with your LEPC’s emergency response
plan?” The response choices are: very familiar, familiar, somewhat familiar, slightly
familiar, and not at all familiar. Other questions with Likert scale response choices used
the “strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree” choice set.
The survey itself included a cover page and closing instructions, which are also
included in Appendix B. The web venue “Survey Monkey” was used to create and
administer the online survey. Responses were tracked and monitored on the
SurveyMonkey website. All information on SurveyMonkey was available only via
password on a secure server. All respondents’ data was kept private and was not visible
to other respondents. The cover page was the first page seen by respondents on the
SurveyMonkey login page, and introduced the survey, stated the objectives and goals of
the project, emphasized the value of participation, made a statement about result
confidentiality in compliance with IRB Regulations, and included information for
retrieval of survey responses. A copy of the IRB approval form is included in Appendix
C.
Respondents were also reminded that participation in the survey is voluntary, and
were provided with contact information for myself, my faculty advisor, Dr. William
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Bowen, and the CSU IRB Board in the event that they had questions or concerns. It was
stated on the login page that entering the access code and logging in to the survey website
served as agreement with and understanding of the terms and conditions of the survey.
The online survey format used radio buttons and textboxes; the copy of the survey
included in Appendix B is a paper representation of this web-based document.
Permission was obtained to include components of Lindell and Brandt’s (2000)
survey instrument (see Appendix). Measures established in the survey questionnaire have
been used and tested in several previous studies (James & Sells, 1981; Lindell & Brandt,
2000; Lindell & Whitney, 1995). As a component of the survey, a goal identification
scale, developed by Lindell and Whitney, includes nine questions about chemical hazards
in the community and how effective emergency planning is in reducing these hazards.
Organization-level data, such as degree of community support and media awareness of
LEPC activities, evacuation experience, and subcommittee structure within the LEPC are
included in eight questions in the survey.
Survey Pre-test. A brief note on the organization of Ohio’s emergency
managers: for emergency management purposes, Ohio’s counties are divided into nine
regions by OEMA. Each of these nine regions is headed by a regional field coordinator,
whom oversees the work of LEPCs within their region. The draft survey was sent to the
manager of the regional field coordinators within the Ohio Emergency Management
Agency (OEMA), and the OEMA director. The survey was field tested by three members
of the OEMA and two members of the OEPA. OEMA is the supervisory body to LEPCs
in Ohio, and the field coordinators directly oversee LEPCs within their region of the
state. These individuals helped to establish face validity and improve format and quality,
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and were able to provide feedback on the survey instrument without creating additional
bias in the study population. Their feedback was helpful in attempting to control for
issues with technical concepts or practitioner-specific language use in the survey
instrument.
Field test respondents provided feedback that led to minor changes in the survey
format, language, and length. They reported in comment that overall the survey appeared
to include valid, relevant questions to the work of LEPC members, and that the
length/time required for the final survey was reasonable for respondents to complete
(approximately 20 minutes.) The length/ time commitment was important in attempting
to obtain the highest possible response rate.
Institutional Review Board consent. All survey materials including
introductory letter, survey instrument and required forms were submitted to the Cleveland
State University (CSU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval to conduct
research with human subjects. Materials include discussion of participant privacy
concerns and any risks presented by participation in the study. A brief description of the
project, copy of the informed consent form and questionnaire was filed with the
application. Approval was granted and is on file at CSU’s IRB office under: IRB Protocol
28231-BOW-HS. (See Appendix C)
Data collection. The process of implementing the survey was a multi-step
process following the Tailored Design Method, as outlined by Dillman et al. (2009).
Once all of the contacts were made and the email addresses verified, an initial
“prenotice” email was sent alerting the respondents that an email containing the LEPC
survey would be arriving within the week. Email was sent from the researcher’s
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University email account to show its affiliation with a CSU student. All email was
addressed individually to each respondent by name at the top of the letter. This “personal
touch” was noted in the literature to improve web response rates (Dillman et al. 2009). As
many individuals receive dozens if not hundreds of emails a day, any step that might be
used to my advantage to improve response rates was taken. This was followed a few days
later by an email containing a link to the survey, including a secure access code, along
with an introductory letter. Email follow-up reminders were sent one week and two
weeks after initial contact to non-respondents.
Questions and hypotheses. An examination of LEPCs was made based, in part,
on two indices developed by Starik et al. (2000). These indices were designed to estimate
the compliance and proactivity (or pro-activeness) of LEPCs (See Table 2).
Question 1: What are the levels of compliance and proactivity for LEPCs?
Question 2: Are the compliance and proactivity levels influenced by the
number of chemical facilities, population size, metropolitan nature of
community, and/or relative accident experience of LEPC?
H(1a): LEPCs compliance scores is positively correlated with number of
regulated facilities.
H(1b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with number of
regulated facilities.
H(2a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with population
size of jurisdiction.
H(2b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with population
size of jurisdiction.

73

H(3a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with greater
“urban-ness.”
H(3b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with greater
“urban-ness.”
H(4a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with more accident
experience.
H(4b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with more accident
experience.
Dependent variables. The dependent variables in this study are the compliance
score and proactivity score, respectively constructed from Table 1. The variables used to
construct these scores or indices were objectively gathered by responses to survey
questions. The values were summarized additively, with uniform weights. The
compliance can be rated on a scale ranging from organizations that are least compliant
with regulatory requirements or “not compliant” fulfilling less than five (5) of the stated
requirements to “mostly compliant” organizations that complete five to six of the listed
requirements, to “compliant” groups that complete seven or more of the listed
requirements, as described and used by Starik et al (2000) and later by. requirements.
Similarly, following along the work of Starik et al. (2000), LEPCs were
determined to be “very proactive” if they completed at minimum three (3) of the
objective measures for proactivity (Table 1) and “somewhat proactive” if they completed
at least one (1) factor. While these categories in both proactive and compliance cases
were considered for classification purposes, they were not used during statistical analysis.
Straight index scores were used as calculated (e.g. a score of “5” on a compliance index
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was used simply as the value “5” in the statistical analysis.) The two dependent variables
are:
Y1 = LEPC Compliance Score
Y2 = LEPC Proactivity Score
Explanatory variables. Explanatory variables, extracted from the literature,
along with their associated hypotheses, are listed in Table 6. The goal of the study is to
elucidate which of these factors can account for variation seen in the dependent variables,
LEPC compliance and LEPC proactivity. The explanatory variables have been
operationalized from their conceptual basis, and included as questions within the survey
questionnaire (Appendix 2). Each individual explanatory variable has an associated
hypothesis, also listed above. The data for the explanatory variables were gathered via
responses to the survey questionnaire. The explanatory variables are as follows:
X1 = number of facilities within jurisdiction
X2 = population size within jurisdiction
X3 = urbanization of jurisdiction
X4 = relative accident experience of LEPC
Each of these variables is being studied for its contribution to the overall level of
compliance or proactivity of each LEPC and has been defined in the literature review in
the context of other research and their expected relationship to each other. LEPCs in
counties with larger numbers of facilities within their jurisdiction have a greater potential
hazard (via quantity and/or location(s) of EHS) and it may follow that they would take
greater measures towards preparedness. LEPCs in counties with larger populations have a
larger number of individuals to protect, in contrast to a very sparsely populated county,
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and therefore may take more or greater steps towards emergency preparedness.
According to the literature, LEPCs in counties with more urban centers (greater urbanness than rural-ness) may be more prone towards preparedness measures to protect cities.
LEPCs that have staff more experienced in actual management of chemical emergencies
may work more towards compliance and proactivity as their experience has informed
them of weaknesses and strengths of their capabilities. Finally, LEPCs with greater
funding for staff may have better compliance and proactivity scores as they simply have
more capacity. More money enables more action and preparation. Paid staff are more
able to devote time and energy to working towards emergency preparedness than
volunteers helping out after other primary employment.
Coding and analysis of data. Raw data was stored in a series of spreadsheets.
Data for each survey question that was associated with a factor for the Compliance Score
was scored with a zero or one for absence or presence of the factor by that LEPC. The
totals for all Compliance Score factors for each LEPC were summed to equal that
LEPC’s Compliance Score with a maximum possible score of eight (8). The Proactivity
Scores were calculated using the same process on the Proactivity Score question data
with a maximum possible score of four (4). Correlation tables and Chronbach’s alpha
were used to ensure internal consistency for each of the factors that make up the Scores.
Any missing values were tabulated, and cases with less than 90% response to the index
questions were not included in the final data set. All hypothesis testing was established at
the 0.05 level of significance, with the exception of where analysis at the 0.01 level could
be confirmed.
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Coded data was sorted and summarized for descriptive measures, and are reported
in the Results chapter of this document. PASW Statistical Software was used to
statistically analyze data. Correlation matrices and factor analysis was used to ensure
independence of variables. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated data was not spherical.
Spearman’s correlation test was run on the data set, in addition to descriptive data
measures. Descriptive data and correlation results were also compared, where
appropriate, with previous U.S. data gathered for the USEPA.
Bootstrapping
The bootstrapping technique was used to resample with replacement giving a new
sample of N=4500. The new sample size was chosen to estimate a value closer to the
total number of LEPCs within the United States. This technique allows the researcher to
expand the sample, which is the best proxy of the population, in order to improve the
statistics that result from the calculations. This technique makes the assumption that the
sample collected is one of many possible samples that may have been gathered at the
time of the research. Bootstrapping allows the researcher to estimate a sampling
distribution for the statistic of interest (the mean) by taking repeated samples with
replacement within the data set (Field, 2009). It essentially regards the data set as the
population from which repeated samples are taken. By taking many repeated samples
(N=4500), it is possible to estimate the sampling distribution and therefore the standard
error, which allows the computation of confidence intervals and eventually tests of
significance (Field, 2009). Data that was bootstrapped was used for hypothesis testing.
The dependent variable data are ordinal (categorical) in nature. The data collected
from the indices provide information in reference to each other (ordered categorical data),
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but not about the characteristics of the information between the data points. In order to
accommodate this data, only appropriate analysis methodologies were utilized.
Spearman’s rank correlation test was used to analyze the relationship between the
dependent variables and each of the respective independent variables.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Introduction
Representatives from a convenience sample of 87 Ohio LEPCs were sent an
invitation to complete an online survey about their work practices and experiences as a
member of an LEPC. Of those, 58 responded and completed the survey, giving an overall
response rate of 67%. Frequencies and cross-tabulations were computed to facilitate data
analysis and comparison with a previously published USEPA study (2008). In 2008 the
USEPA completed its most recent round of surveys on LEPCs nationwide. Data from this
investigation is examined relative to national averages to analyze whether similar trends
exist and to establish grounds for generalization to LEPCs nationwide.
The results of hypothesis testing are limited to measurement of LEPC compliance
and proactivity, relative to the objectives being studied: number of chemical facilities
within county, urban-rural characterization of county, chemical accident experience of
LEPC, and population size of county. This study measures this relationship over the
course of a period of time between one and five years. Future studies may provide a more
longitudinal, comprehensive measure of these relationships by examining them over
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longer period of time. Any results of this study compared with the 2008 USEPA
nationwide study were only included when the questions were identical.
Validity and Reliability
In general, validity is a way to gauge whether the researcher is actually measuring
the phenomenon that they are attempting to measure. Threats to validity are always a
concern in social science research, and attempts were made to control for threats to the
validity of this study. Internal validity or logical and/or causal flaws within the research
can be impacted by several areas within the research including subject variability,
population size missing factors, and poor data interpretation among others (Shadish,
Cook and Campbell 2002). Attempts were made to control for validity through the use of
several methods. A partial correlation test, shown below in Table 7, and Chronbach’s
alpha were used to establish measures of internal consistency. The partial correlation
analysis showed that each of the variables being measured is independent and
uncorrelated, and the Reliability analysis showed an acceptable result of

= 0.83.

Table 7.
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Facilities
Facilities

Pop. Size

1
-.123
(.179)

Pop. Size

"Urbanness"

# Chemical Accidents

-.123

-.076

-.002

(.179)

(.284)

(.493)

-.051

.045

(.353)

(.368)

1

-.076

-.051

(.284)

(.353)

# Chemical

-.002

.045

.053

Accidents

(.493)

(.368)

(.346)

"Urbanness"

1
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.053
(.346)
1

Principle Component Analysis (PCA), the results of which are shown in Table 8,
shows that the four independent variables are more or less equally distributed in their
explanation of the total variance. The extracted results show that each of the four
independent variables explain approximately one-quarter of the variation noted in the
sample. The primary outcome of PCA is to use an orthogonal transformation to look for
correlation between the variables. This analysis also showed the independent variables in
the data set to be uncorrelated.
Table 8.
Total Variance Explained by Principle Component Analysis
Component

Eigenvalues

% Variance

Cumulative %

# of Facilities

1.14

28.499

28.499

Population Size

1.054

26.341

54.84

"Urbanness"

0.992

24.79

79.629

# Chemical Accidents

0.815

20.371

100

Survey Results
Demographic characterization of counties by population size. The
respondents reported representing a range of county populations, in both size and
urbanization (see Tables 9 and 10), with nearly 40% (23 groups) representing a
population of 50,000 or less, almost one-quarter (13 groups) representing a population
between 50,001 and 100,000, and around one-third representing a county between
100,001 and a half-million individuals. Five percent of respondents oversee a county with
between a half-million and one million people, and only around 3 ½% of respondents
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reported serving a population of more than one million individuals. When compared to
US Census data from 2010, the percentages of each population category represented in
this study are relatively similar to the percentage distribution of the state data by county.
In comparison to the 2008 US EPA survey of LEPCs, Ohio contains a larger percentage
of counties (LEPC jurisdictions) with populations in the 50,001-100,000 and 100,001500,000 categories than the nation has overall. The U.S. overall contains a larger
proportion of small (population less than 50,000) LEPC jurisdictions than Ohio (62.5% of
U.S.; 39.7% of sample).
Table 9.
Population Size Served by LEPCs
US Census Data

2008 Nationwide

for Ohio counties

Comparison

(2010)

Study

23 (39.7%)

39 (44.3%)

62.50%

13 (22.4%)

21 (23.9%)

15.80%

17 (29.3%)

23 (26.1%)

17.20%

3 (5.1%)

3 (3.4%)

2.60%

2 (3.5%)

2 (2.3%)

1.90%

58

88

939

Sample Data
Population Size
(Ohio)
less than 50,000
50,001 to
100,000
100,001 to
500,000
500,001 to
1,000,000
more than
1,000,000
n
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Characterization of LEPC service areas. The service area most commonly
represented in this sample was “Mainly Rural/ Some Suburban” with approximately onehalf of the respondent LEPCs response, while the second most commonly reported area
represented among respondents was “Mainly Rural” with one-quarter of the response.
“Mainly Suburban” and “Mainly Urban” each accounted for less than 10% of the
respondents, respectively, and finally “Mainly Suburban/ Some Urban” was characterized
as the service area for 5% of the respondents. Comparatively as shown in Table 8, the
distribution of LEPCs in the Ohio sample is primarily mainly rural/ some suburban
(51.7%), while according to the USEPA 2008 study, LEPCs jurisdictions in the nation
overall are more balanced towards an even split between mainly rural (45.8%) and
mainly rural/ some suburban (41.3%.)
Table 10.
Characterization of LEPC Service Areas or “Urban-ness”
Characterization of Service

2008 Nationwide

Area

Ohio Sample f (%)

Comparison Study (%)

Mainly Rural

15 (25.9%)

45.80%

30 (51.7%)

41.30%

5 (8.6%)

3.70%

3 (5.2%)

6.60%

Mainly Urban

5 (8.6%)

2.60%

n

58

939

Mainly Rural/ Some
Suburban
Mainly Suburban
Mainly Suburban/ Some
Urban
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Characterization of LEPC membership. Sample LEPCs reported more than 22
different entities represented in community LEPCs, including emergency
medical/hospital personnel, firefighters, emergency services personnel, law enforcement,
regulated industry, public health agencies, Red Cross/ volunteer organizations, and
state/local officials (all represented in more than 90% of groups surveyed.) A complete
list of all represented entities is available in Table 11.
Table 11.
Representative Organizations Participating in LEPCs
2008 Nationwide
Groups Represented:

Ohio Sample f (%)
Comparison Study (%)

Agriculture

22 (39.3%)

Not included

Chief Administrative Officer's Staff

25 (44.6%)

Not included

Civil Defense/ Emrgncy Management

52 (92.9%)

87.10%

Community Groups

34 (60.7%)

63.60%

Emergency Medical/ Hospitals

58 (100%)

83.40%

Environmental Agency

34 (60.7%)

45.50%

Firefighting

58 (100%)

93.20%

1 (1.8%)

Not included

Law Enforcement

58 (100%)

90.70%

Local Industry

54 (96.5%)

68.30%

Labor Groups
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2008 Nationwide
Groups Represented:

Ohio Sample f(%)
Comparison Study (%)

Municipal/ County Attorney's Office

11 (19.6%)

Not included

Newsmedia (print, A/V)

35 (62.5%)

54.00%

Planning/ Community Development

11 (19.6%)

Not included

Public Health

58 (100%)

83.70%

Public Works/ Engineering

39 (69.6%)

Not included

Red Cross/ Volunteer Groups

54 (96.5%)

80%

Schools

15 (26.8%)

Not included
State: 11.3%

State/ Local Elected Officials

51 (91.1%)

Local: 83.3%

Truck/ Rail Carriers

7 (12.5%)

52.40%

13 (23.2%)*

14.1%**

58

939

Other (please specify)
n

* Other includes: concerned citizens, amateur radio, Coroners office, Military, US Coast Guard, Bank, JFS
** Other includes: local schools, colleges, universities, agriculture groups, public utilities

Two-thirds of respondent LEPCs reported having greater than 20 members, while
the remaining one-third reported between 11-20 members. The average meeting
attendance was stated as being 11-15 individuals for 41% of the groups, with around 30%
of LEPCs in the sample reporting between 16-20 attendees, and around 10% of LEPCs
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respectively noting meeting attendance as either more than 20 members or 6-10
members. One group acknowledged that its meetings generally included only 1-5 persons
in attendance. So while most groups (two-thirds) in the sample reported having 20 or
more members in their LEPC, more than 60% have meeting attendance of 15 or less
participants.
Table 12.
LEPC Sample Membership and Meeting Attendance
Average Reported
Sample

LEPC Group

Member Attendance at

Membership

Meetings

f (%)

f (%)

1-5 members

0 (0%)

1 (1.7%)

6-10 members

0 (0%)

6 (10.3%)

11-15 members

8 (13.8%)

24 (41.4%)

16-20 members

11 (18.9%)

20 (34.5%)

more than 20 members

39 (67%)

7 (12.1%)

n

58

58

Membership/ Attendance

LEPC membership numbers and meeting frequency. Meetings were reported
as occurring quarterly in the last 12 months for 44% of groups, biannually for one-quarter
of respondents in the sample, annually for 16% (9) of groups, and more frequently than
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biannually for 15% of groups. In addition, one LEPC reported meeting monthly for a
total of 12 times in the last year. 83.5% LEPCs in the sample meet on average at least
quarterly or more frequently. This is only slightly more frequently than the USEPA
study, which reported 72.4% of LEPCs meeting quarterly or more frequently. Nearly
10% of LEPCs in the USEPA study hadn’t met in the previous year, due to lack of
member participation.
Table 13.
LEPC meeting frequency
Ohio Sample

USEPA 2008 Comparison Study

Number of Meetings

f (%)

f (%)

0 times

0 (0%)

80 (8.8%)

1-2 times

9 (16.4%)

64 (7%)

3-4 times

25 (43.6%)

352 (38.7%)

5-6 times

15 (23.6%)

148 (16.3%)

more than 6

8 (14.5%)

158 (17.4%)

Other (specify)

1 (1.8%)*

107 (11.8%)**

n

58

909

* monthly
** “as needed”
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LEPC member training, staffing, and funding/support. Most LEPCs in the
sample (76%) reported they do not have a formal orientation program for new members,
but do form subcommittees to complete the organization’s tasks (80%). Most respondent
LEPCs also set annual goals and objectives for the organization as a whole (78%), assess
their performance annually or more frequently (65%), and discuss the results of their
performance appraisal within the LEPC (62%). Nearly half of the responding
organizations reported setting annual goals and objectives for their subcommittees (49%).
As shown in Table 14 nearly two-thirds (65%) of surveyed LEPCs reported
having paid full or part-time staff, either working strictly for the LEPC or subcontracting
from the local EMA. Most respondents (84%) reported staff working part-time (less than
30 hours per week) including nearly one quarter of sampled LEPCs reporting staff
working less than 5 hours per week.
Table 14.
LEPC Paid Staff
Does your LEPC have paid full/ part-time staff?

yes f (%)

no f (%)

How many hrs/week?

38 (65.5%)

20 (34.5%)

1-5 hrs

8 (21.0%)

6-10 hrs

7 (18.4%)

11-20 hrs

11 (28.9%)

21-30 hrs

6 (15.8%)

31-40 hrs

4 (10.5%)

other (specify)**

2 (5.3%)

* contract with EMA for support staff and administrative costs
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All respondents to the survey also reported some sort of operating budget (see
Table 15). The primary sources of operating funds for LEPC activities are state fees from
EPCRA submission (84%) and Federal HMEP (Hazardous Materials Emergency
Preparedness) grant funding (73%). Fewer groups received funding from other sources,
including local direct funding (16%), other state direct funding (7%), local fees (9%),
private industry support (7%), and in-kind/ indirect support (9%).
Table 15.
Sources of LEPC Operating Budgets

Ohio Sample

2008 USEPA

f (%)

Comparison Survey

Submission

48 (83.6%)

54.20%

Federal - HMEP grant funding

42 (72.7%)

39.70%

Local direct funding

10 (16.4%)

33.70%

Other state direct funding

4 (7.3%)

20.50%

Local fees

5 (9.1%)

8.70%

Private industry

4 (7.3%)

8.30%

In-kind/ Indirect support

5 (9.1%)

56.30%

0 (0%)

64.10%

10 (16.4%)*

4.8%**

Source of Funding

State fees from EPCRA

No formal funding or direct
support
Other (specify)

*Other grants, SERC Cost Recovery Program grants, other fines and penalties, donations
** other grants, donations, membership dues
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This differs from the USEPA 2008 survey, which reported only 40.7% of
respondents having an operating budget and a full 64.1% of LEPCs nationwide have no
direct funding at all. If those results are accurate, more than half the population of United
States LEPCs is functioning without an operating budget. By comparison, 100% of
surveyed LEPCs in the sample have some form of operating budget.
Non-financial support in the form of technical assistance or guidance is reported
by study subjects to come from a wide variety of sources. According to this study, greater
than 94% of respondent LEPCs have received technical guidance from State of Ohio
agencies in the last five years, including SERC, State EMA, or State EPA. The Federal
EPA has provided guidance to 29% of Ohio LEPC respondents, and FEMA has provided
aid to nearly 13%. Agencies noted to support LEPCs in fewer cases include Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) (9%), Department of Transportation (DOT) (7%), and
Department of Justice (DOJ) (4%). Less than one percent of respondents report receiving
no technical guidance or support. By comparison, USEPA reports 27.2% of LEPCs
nationwide included in their 2008 study received technical assistance or guidance from
federal government agencies, primarily from USEPA (58.6%) and FEMA (51.7%).
LEPC outcomes: Emergency plans and member familiarity. The primary
tangible outcome or “deliverable” of LEPCs is an approved emergency response plan
(ERP); see Table 16 for related survey results. Of the organizations surveyed in this
sample, the vast majority (more than 80% in each category) responded that their
emergency plan has been updated, reviewed by the SERC, and exercised in some form
within the last 12 months. Of the remaining groups, nearly one in ten groups report
having reviewed/ updated their plan within the last 1-2 years. Of the remaining LEPCs,
90

only one group stated that it has been over 2 years since they’ve reviewed/ updated/
exercised their plan, and one group did not have knowledge of the last time their LEPCs
plan was reviewed, updated, or exercise, respectively. When sample respondents were
asked their personal familiarity with their LEPC’s emergency response plan, 72%
reported that they are “very familiar” with the plan, while 28% reported being “familiar”
with the plan. None of the participants indicated lack of familiarity with the plan. This
indicates that at least amongst those surveyed, there is good member participation in ERP
knowledge.
Table 16.
Emergency Response Plan Exercise
When did your
LEPC last update

When did SERC

its emergency

last review ERP?

plan?

When did LEPC
last exercise its
ERP?

Time Period

f (%)

f (%)

f (%)

less than 12 months

49 (83%)

50 (86.8%)

53 (94.3%)

1-2 yrs

7 (9.4%)

7 (11.3%)

2 (3.8%)

over 2 yrs

1 (1.9%)

0 (0%)

3 (5.1%)

Don't have an ERP

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Don't know when
reviewed/updated

1 (1.9%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Other (specify)

0 (0%)

1 (1.9%)*

0 (0%)

n

58

58

58

* ERP not reviewed by SERC
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By comparison, in the USEPA 2008 survey, only 58.7% of participant LEPCs
nationwide reported updating and submitting an ERP within the year prior to the survey.
This would seem indicative of either higher compliance with plan submission in Ohio, or
of a “sea change” in LEPC plan submission between 2008 and 2010. While there has
been increased attention on emergency planning of late due to the increased number and
severity of natural disasters occurring worldwide, Ohio hasn’t been a focal point of these
disasters. It is therefore unlikely that Ohio’s higher compliance with updating and
submitting ERP’s is related to any outside influence that is different from LEPCs in other
parts of the nation.
LEPC outcomes: Emergency plan exercises and accident experience. An
additional requirement of LEPCs is that their emergency plan is exercised regularly using
several methods over a five-year period. It is for this reason that LEPCs were asked to
describe their plan exercises over the past five years, rather than the past year. The results
are described below and illustrated in Table 17. The majority of respondents have
practiced by using a “table-top hazmat exercise” (90%), and/or a “full-scale (multidepartmental) hazmat exercises” (90%). Nearly three-quarters of participating LEPCs
stated they have exercised their plan using a “single function drill (e.g. communications
drill)” during the last five years. Of the groups that stated they have exercised their
emergency plan in some form, 96% reported having done so in the last 12 months. The
remaining 4% of respondents report having exercised their plan within the last 1-2 years.
By comparison, in USEPA’s 2008 survey, 71.3% of LEPCs that reported
exercising their emergency plans reported doing so within the past year. This is also
similar to previous nationwide surveys, which showed that approximately 69% in 1999
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and 74% in 1994 had practiced their ERP that year. So nationwide, rates of plan exercise
seem to be holding steady. Within Ohio, the number of LEPCs exercising their plans in a
variety of ways seems to be notably higher than the average nationally. The reason for
this difference is unclear, but may be related to greater funding level or more active
groups.
Table 17.
How LEPCs are Exercising Their Emergency Plans

Ohio Sample

USEPA 2008 Comparison Survey

Have exercised

no

0 (0%)

23.20%

emergency plan

yes

58 (100%)

76.80%

41 (71%)

47.80%

Table-top Exercise

53 (90%)

83.50%

Full-scale Exercise

53 (90%)

68.90%

Actual response

34 (58%)

47.80%

Public briefing

16 (28%)

13.10%

Other (specify)

4 (7%)*

4.5%**

Single-function
(communications) drill

* in-house drill w/private industry & schools, multi-functional, multi-agency exercise in conjunction w/
state, 16-county functional exercise
** functional exercise

In the Ohio sample, nearly 60% of total respondents reported responding to an
actual emergency during the past five years, while only around one-quarter of the
subjects report having had a public briefing on emergency management in the same time
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period. As shown in Table 18, approximately one-half of respondent LEPCs stated they
have managed more than 15 chemical accidents within the past five years. All other
representative counties in the study responded to fewer chemical accidents according to
study subjects. Seventeen percent of counties responded to 1-5 chemical accidents,
around 20% of counties experienced 6-10 chemical accidents, and almost 10% saw 11-15
accidents within the last five years.
Table 18.
Number of Chemical Accidents within Last Five Years
USEPA 2008
Chemical Accidents

Ohio Sample f (%)
Comparison Study (%)

none

1 (1.9%)

18.80%

1-5

8 (13.2%)

48.90%

6-10

11 (18.9%)

12.50%

11-15

5 (9.4%)

4.60%

More than 15

29 (49.1%)

15.20%

Other

4 (7.5%)*

not included

One-third of responding LEPCs revised their ERP (emergency response plan) as a
result of their experience with chemical accidents. Only two percent of responding
LEPCs changed their LEPC priorities, increased their meeting frequency, recognized a
need for first responder training, or addressed HAZMAT equipment priorities,
respectively in response to accident experience. One-half of LEPCs responding stated
their experience with chemical accidents resulted in improved coordination in their LEPC
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operations, but 43% of respondents felt that their experience with actual chemical
accidents had no impact on the way their LEPC operates. This result seems cognitively
dissonant in that the expectation is that experience with actual chemical accidents would
improve response. This researcher posits that either LEPCs are adequately prepared for
the type of emergencies they are managing (and therefore not gaining new knowledge
from experience) or LEPCs aren’t recognizing learning opportunities when they present
themselves. Another possibility is that experience with one accident may be irrelevant to
future accidents, as each experience is unique and diverse compared to the next.
Exploring LEPCs post-accident review process is another potential future avenue for
research.
By comparison, in USEPA’s 2008 study of LEPCs nationwide, chemical accident
experience most impacted LEPC functionality by improving coordination efforts with
industry/ facilities (54%) and by revising their emergency plans based on lessons learned
(42%.) Similar to the results of this research, the 2008 nationwide study also stated that
44% of LEPCs within the U.S. reported no impact from experience with chemical
accidents in the last five years.

LEPC priorities and resources. LEPCs spend part of their time determining the
size of Vulnerable Zones around chemical facilities. Participating sample LEPCs report
using each of four different methodologies to complete this task: DOT’s Emergency
Response Guidebook, EPA’s Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis, Computer
Models (CAMEO, ALOHA, WISER, ADASHI), and/or GIS. Most commonly, LEPCs
reported using DOT’s Emergency Response Guidebook (88%) and Computer models
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(52%) in their determinations. Less commonly, groups stated that they’ve used GIS
mapping (38%) and/or EPA’s Technical Guidance book (29%) as well. LEPCs were able
to select more than one response for this question. These results are not surprising, and
support the idea that LEPCs are still limited in their use of technology when addressing
local hazard planning.
When asked what resources are utilized by the LEPC for chemical information,
emergency planning, drills, and actual emergencies, 92% of respondents reported using
CAMEO computer modeling software, 81% reported using EPCRA Tier I and Tier II
data, 56% reported using other GIS data, and 21% reported using RMP data. This finding
reiterates the idea that use of technology in case of actual drills and emergencies is
limited, and is similar to sources used in determining facilities’ Vulnerable Zones.
In addition to obtaining information from books and electronic sources, LEPCs
also rely on the services of supporting organizations and related groups for information
and assistance in emergency planning. Survey participants were asked which
organizations they interacted with in the last 12 months. Results indicated 100% of
groups rely on State EMA, 98% depend on State EPA, and 92% trust LEPCs in adjacent
jurisdictions with their concerns. Finally, 73% of LEPCs cited LEPCs in other
jurisdictions (not adjacent to them geographically) and 60% stated EPA regional staff
(USEPA Region V for this sample) were resources they used as well. Table 19 below
shows LEPCs rating activities their group prioritized.
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Table 19.
Activities prioritized by LEPCs within the past year
Strongly

Activities

Strongly

disagree

Disagree

Agree

Agree

f (%)

f (%)

f (%)

f (%)

4 (7.7%)

20 (34.6%)

27 (46.2%)

6 (9.6%)

2 (3.8%)

17 (28.8%)

29 (50%)

8 (13.5%)

0 (0%)

1 (1.9%)

31 (53.8%)

25 (42.3%)

0 (0%)

6 (9.6%)

36 (62%)

17 (28.8%)

1 (1.9%)

17 (28.8%)

32 (55.8%)

7 (11.5%)

0 (0%)

3 (5.7%)

31(53.8%)

22 (38.5%)

7 (11.5%)

12 (21.1%)

31 (53.8%)

7 (11.5%)

Activities that award
hazard reduxn
Chemical release
prevention
Community emergency
preparedness
Community hazard
awareness
Community hazard
reduction
Hazard vulnerability
assessment
Inherent safety
opportunity audits

The top three responses, combining the “agree” and “strongly agree” rankings, were
community emergency preparedness (98%), hazard vulnerability assessment (94%), and
community hazard awareness (90%). Interestingly, although community hazard
awareness was ranked very highly as a priority, the majority of respondents reported not
having a public briefing within the last five (5) years.
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Impact of recent disasters on LEPC activity. Next the survey participants were
asked to provide information about their LEPC and whether any changes had occurred
since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/01, as shown below in Table 20. In general, when asked
whether there has been any change in their LEPCs overall activity since 9/11/01, onethird of respondents state their activity has stayed the same, one-half of respondents state
their activity has “increased somewhat,” and one in five groups state their activity has
“increased greatly.” When asked what has been the target of the LEPCs increased activity
(post-9/11), 80% of respondents selected “emergency planning”, one-half selected
“educating the public” or “being proactive” respectively, and 20% chose hazard reduction
or accident prevention, respectively.
Table 20.
LEPC Activity Post 9/11/01
Since the events of 9/11/01, which
Since the events of 9/11/01, the overall

items has your LEPC increased its

activity of your LEPC has:

emphasis on (check all that apply):

Activity Level Change:

f (%)

Activities

f (%)

Increased greatly

10 (17.6%)

Emergency planning

47 (80.4%)

Increased somewhat

29 (49%)

Hazard reduction

11 (19.6%)

Stayed the same

17 (29.4%)

Accident prevention

10 (17.6%)

Decreased somewhat

0 (0%)

Educating the public

32 (54.9%)

Decreased greatly

1 (2.0%)

Being proactive

31 (52.9%)

I don't know

1 (2.0%)

other (specify)

5 (7.8%)*

* no change, responder/ facility training, same goals before/ after 9/11/01
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LEPC proactive efforts and familiarity. In order to gauge the familiarity of
respondents with terminology used to represent some of the more proactive actions
possible for LEPCs, they were asked to indicate familiarity with several terms, the results
of which are indicated in Table 21.
Table 21.
LEPC Familiarity with Proactive terminology & incorporation into Mission Statement
Which of the following

Which are incorporated

terms are you familiar

into LEPC mission

with:

statement?

f (%)

f (%)

Inherent safety

26 (45.1%)

18 (31.4%)

Precautionary principle

13 (21.6%)

7 (11.8%)

30 (51%)

20 (35.3%)

Hazard reduction

53 (92.2%)

42 (72.5%)

Vulnerability management

47 (80.4%)

21 (64.7%)

1*

1*

Terms

Primary prevention

Comments

*not commonly used terms in EM or LEPCs, none of the above, not sure

Nearly all of the survey respondents stated they were familiar with “hazard
reduction”, 80% were familiar with “vulnerability management”, and approximately onehalf were familiar with “primary prevention” and “inherent safety” respectively. Only
one-quarter of study subjects recognized the term “Precautionary Principle”. When asked
which of these terms were incorporated into the mission of the LEPC, three-quarters of
the groups chose hazard reduction, two-thirds chose vulnerability management, and one99

third chose primary prevention, or inherent safety. Precautionary Principle was only
incorporated into 12% of respondent LEPC mission statements.
Finally, respondents were asked to rate their degree of agreement with the
following: “The LEPC on which I serve has had a positive impact on chemical safety in
my community (prevention, preparedness, and response.)”. 82% of respondents selected
either “agree” or “strongly agree,” indicating a strong sense that these LEPC members
feel that their LEPC is actively helping their community.
Compliance and proactivity levels. Using the criteria outlined in the
Introduction in Table 2, participant LEPC responses were compiled additively and scored
to determine group compliance and proactivity levels. The majority of respondents, who
make up the majority of LEPCs within Ohio, were found to be both compliant with
SERC and Federal rules and requirements and also very proactive, according to the
criteria set out at the outset of this study. No respondents were found to be out of
compliance, and only one was found to have zero proactive factors. Spearman’s
Correlation showed mild yet significant correlation between the compliance and
proactivity dependent variables ( = 0.026,

= 0.05). It is possible that the distinction

between the two is not as clear as previously thought. It may be that proactivity is merely
an extension of the compliance variable, as activity level has increased within the last
decade due to societal circumstances (e.g. fear of terrorism, increased homeland security,
etc.) In future research, a MANOVA test might help to untangle the correlation between
the two dependent variables in this study. It is also possible that the weak correlation is
an artifact of the large (N=4500) sample size generated from the bootstrapping. For the
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purposes of this research, results will be considered with the possibility that the
compliance and proactivity may not be viewed as separate entities.
Table 22 indicates the range of compliance and proactivity scores indicated based
on the compliance-proactivity index. The dependent variables (of proactivity and
compliance) included in the hypotheses are categorical ordered data, and it is necessary to
use an appropriate methodology to analyze the data within the confines of its limitations.
A Spearman’s Rank correlation methodology was used to examine the data for
relationships between dependent and independent variables.
Table 22.
Compliance and Proactivity Scores of Respondent LEPCs
Respective
Index Score

Compliance

Proactivity

f (%)

f (%)

0

0 (0%)

1 (1.7%)

1

0 (0%)

2 (3.4%)

2

0 (0%)

5 (8.6%)

3

1(1.7%)

11 (18.9%)

4

3 (5.2%

28 (48.3%)

5

4 (6.9%)

11 (18.9%)

6

3 (5.2%

n/a

7

34 (58.6%)

n/a

8

13 (22.4%)

n/a

n

58

58
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Bootstrapping and Correlation Analysis
To improve robustness of the data analysis, the bootstrap technique was employed
to resample the data with replacement. The bootstrap method is a means of computerbased simulation designed to improve statistical inference by “assigning measures of
accuracy to statistical estimates” (Efron and Tibshirani 1998). Bootstrapping is a nonparametric method of data resampling, designed to approximate the sampling distribution
of an estimator (Cassell, 2007). As a non-parametric method, it makes no assumptions
about the distribution of the original data sample and assumes that it is one out of any
number of random samples that may have been collected. Instead the bootstrap technique
acts to take many random sub-samples of the “original sample” in order to increase the
strength of the statistical argument. This is useful in this situation as the original data was
drawn from a small sample of n=58. The bootstrap sample size can be set at any number,
one commonly used sample value is 1,000. As a means of attempting simulation of the
LEPCs in the United States, n=4500 was used for statistical analysis.
The mean and standard deviation computed from the bootstrapped data were used
in a correlation analysis to examine the relationship between each of the dependent and
independent variables.3 Each of the hypotheses is described with justification for the
expectations in the literature review section of this document. The relationships and
results noted will be described below. Table 23 shows Spearman’s Correlation results for

3

Binary logistic regression analysis was used initially to test the hypotheses, with
no significant results. Correlation analysis was chosen as a more appropriate statistic to
measure the effects of the independent variables.
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the four tested hypotheses. Of those listed, only “proactivity” and “number of facilities”
is significantly correlated.
Table 23.
Spearman’s Rank Correlation for Tested Hypotheses
Number of
Population

Characterization

Accident

Size

of Jurisdiction

Experience

Regulated
Facilities
Compliance

Proactivity

0.038*,

-0.015,

0.001,

-0.002,

Sig.=0.006,

Sig.=.151

Sig.=.466

Sig.=.458

0.009,

-0.023**,

0.015,

0.004,

Sig. =0.263 Sig.=0.065

Sig.=0.164

Sig.=0.400

*Significantly correlated at the 0.01 level.
**Nearly significant correlation, significance at 0.06 level.

N=4500

H(1a): LEPCs compliance scores is positively correlated with number of
regulated facilities.
H(1b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with number of
regulated facilities.
Compliance and number of regulated facilities was positively correlated ( =
.038,

= 0.01). It is logical that the more regulated facilities an LEPC is working with,

the more likely they would be compliant. More facilities means more hazard, and LEPCs
work to help mitigate that hazard. The cross-tabulation below in Table 24 shows how the
majority of LEPCs in the sample are relatively compliant and have less than 45 regulated
facilities within their jurisdiction.
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Table 24.
Cross-tabulation of Compliance scores by Number of Regulated Facilities in Jurisdictions
Number of Regulated Facilities
Compliance
Scores

0-15

16-30

3

1

4

2

31-45

46-60 61-100

101-200

more

Grand

than 200

Total
1

1

5

3

6

1

1

7

8

11

7

2

4

8

5

3

1

2

1

Grand Total

17

18

8

4

5

3
1

4
2

2

3

1

35

1

13

3

58

Proactivity and number of regulated facilities was not significantly correlated.
This was surprising, as one would expect that proactivity might go up in areas with more
regulated facilities. It is also possible that LEPC participants are simply preoccupied with
simply managing and reacting to hazards posed by greater number of regulated facilities
within their jurisdiction. They may not have the capacity to be proactive, but only enough
to keep up with the status quo. This is something to consider more thoroughly in future
research.
H(2a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with population
size of jurisdiction.
H(2b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with population
size of jurisdiction.
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There was no significant correlation between compliance and population size or
proactivity and population size. However, there was an almost significant correlation
between proactivity and population size ( = -0.023). This lack of a significant finding
was surprising. It was expected that areas with larger populations would be more
compliant or proactive than other areas. This “lack” of finding may be due to there being
generally high levels of both compliance and proactivity throughout the sample.
Particularly when compared to the 2008 USEPA nationwide data, Ohio has higher levels
of both compliance and proactivity than the United States does overall. Table 25 shows
the cross-tabulation between compliance score and population size within an LEPC
jurisdiction. The majority of LEPCs in the sample have populations of less than 500,000
within their jurisdiction and are relatively compliant with meeting the regulatory
requirements for LEPCs.
Table 25.
Cross-Tabulation of Compliance Score and Population Size
Population Size

Compliance Score

0-

50,001-

100,001-

500,001-

more than

50,000

100,000

500,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

2

1

3

1

4
5

3

1

6

1

1

7

14

9

10

8

7

1

4
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2
1

The near significant correlation ( = 0.065) between proactivity and population
size suggests there may be something here worth looking into further for future research.
There is data in the public administration literature that suggests that more heavily
populated areas have organizations with greater capacity (capacity meaning access to
funding, staff, services). There may be a link to look into in future research between
proactivity in LEPCs and organizational capacity. Table 26 shows the cross-tabulation of
the proactivity scores by population size of the sample jurisdictions.
Table 26.
Cross-Tabulation of Proactivity Score and Population Size
Population Size
0Proactivity Score

50,001- 100,001-

50,000 100,000

500,000

0

1

2

5

3

6

4

4

4

13

8

12

500,001-

more than

1,000,000

1,000,000

1
3

1

H(3a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with greater
“urban-ness.”
H(3b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with greater
“urban-ness.”
There was no significant correlative relationship between compliance score and
characterization of the jurisdiction or between proactivity score and the same. It was
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expected that more urban areas would be more compliant and more proactive than more
rural areas.
H(4a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with more accident
experience.
H(4b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with more accident
experience.
Neither compliance nor proactivity was significantly correlated with accident
experience of LEPC. LEPCs with more accident experience within the past year were
expected to be more compliant and proactive. Direct first-hand experience with accidents
was expected to result in LEPCs more motivated to meet and possibly exceed compliance
requirements in order to ensure their preparedness for future accidents. Again, relatively
high rates of compliance and proactivity in the sample overall might account for less
sensitivity to variation related to accident experience. Future research might also address
a longer retrospective time horizon for accident experience. There may be a longer lag
time between accident experience and organizational changes, depending on the pace of
change within the organization.
A few other interesting findings not included in the hypothesis testing are
included in the next few tables below. Table 27 shows a cross-tabulation between funding
for staff and number of chemical accidents. The interesting finding is that more than 1/3
of respondents (23/58) had funding for staff and also reported responding to more than 15
EHS accidents/ spills within the past year. This suggests that funding is following number
of accidents. The researcher cannot posit another logical reason to think areas with
greater funding would have more accidents.
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Table 27.
Cross-Tabulation of Staff Funding and Number of Chemical Accidents in Previous Year
Funding for Staff
# of Chemical Accidents

No

Yes

Grand Total

0

1

0

1

1-5

4

3

7

6-10

4

8

12

11-15

2

3

5

15+

10

23

33

Grand Total

21

37

58

For comparison, Table 28 below shows the cross-tabulation of funding for staff
and number of EHS facilities within an LEPCs jurisdiction. If the increased funding is
due primarily to increase hazard (i.e. more EHS facilities) it would seem the pattern
would be similar between funding and number of facilities as it is between funding and
number of accidents. This is another area of note to follow up in future research.
In Table 28, the cross-tabulation between LEPC staff funding and the number of
regulated facilities within a county are not similar in trend to the results for number of
accidents and funding. This suggests that perhaps funding is being allocated more heavily
to areas with higher accident rates, rather than to areas with higher hazard (i.e. more EHS
facilities).
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Table 28.
Cross-Tabulation of Funding For Staff and Number of Facilities within a Jurisdiction
# of Facilities

no

yes

Grand Total

0-15

8

9

17

101-200

1

2

3

16-30

7

11

18

31-45

2

6

8

46-60

1

3

4

61-100

1

4

5

more than 200

1

2

3

Grand Total

21

37

58

Finally, LEPCs were asked subjectively whether they felt that their activities had
changed at all since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. The results of a cross-tabulation of
an LEPCs’ own assessment of their activity level change since 9/11/2001 and their
proactivity score is shown below in Table 29. Most LEPCs responded that the activity
levels of their group “increased somewhat” (32/58), and the majority of those (23/32)
were considered extremely proactive, having completed at least four of the factors listed
on the proactivity index.
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Table 29.
Cross-Tabulation of Proactivity Score and Subjective Impact of 9/11/01 on LEPC
Activities
Proactivity

I don't

decreased

stayed

Score

know

greatly

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

3

0

4
Grand Total

increased

increased

Grand

greatly

Total

1

0

1

3

1

0

5

0

4

7

4

15

1

0

8

23

5

37

1

1

15

32

9

58

the same somewhat

The implications of these research findings bring light to some of the changes in
LEPC structure and actions since their inception 25 years ago. Much of the work of
LEPCs is fraught with complexity and uncertainty. These minimally funded
organizations are trying to make the best of an imperfect system to help ensure
community safety and security. The implications will be discussed further in the
Discussion chapter along with some additional questions and basis for future research.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This chapter summarizes the importance of this topic and how this particular
study contributes to greater understanding of emergency planning and its functions. In
Section 5.1 a review of the research results and hypothesis tests will be followed by a
discussion of additional findings not in the original research questions. Section 5.2 will
discuss theoretical and practitioner implications. Section 5.3 will examine the limitations
of this study and how it informs future research. Finally, in Section 5.4, the chapter
concludes with suggestions for future research based on findings and final comments
drawn from the research findings.
Emergency planning is an evolving field. Since the inception of EPCRA in 1987,
the field has had to adapt to a world with greater threats of terrorism and a more
tumultuous ecosystem with regard to severity and frequency of natural disasters. Events
like the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and subsequent nuclear catastrophe
illustrate some of the complexity and unforeseen complications that can occur when
serious disaster strikes. It is estimated that around 20,000 people were killed in the
catastrophe. In the United States, we have begun to adapt our emergency planning to a
111

more "all-hazards" approach to localize planning for many types of emergencies within a
few coordinating agencies at each locality. The results of this study show that LEPCs are
doing their best to keep up with the jobs they have been tasked with, and in the study
sample, are faring better than has been reported in several previous national surveys.
Summary of Research Results and Results of Hypothesis Tests
In 1987, EPCRA took United States environmental policy in a bold direction
towards “informational regulation” of environmental hazards. Inclusion of the public in
hazardous chemical emergency planning was thought to improve the quality of
emergency response by bringing together experts and local stakeholders in important
decisions about disaster planning and management. Overall the LEPCs studied in this
research were meeting the expectations and standards set out for them, with regards to
emergency planning. Provision of information to the public was achieved in lesser
numbers.
LEPCs in this study came from primarily smaller population counties with around
60% of the sample from counties with populations under 100,000 people. These counties
are primarily considered “mainly rural/ some suburban”. In the United States overall, the
largest represented area in general is slightly less populous, with around 60% being under
50,000 in each LEPC jurisdiction. All LEPCs that participated in the survey included
diverse memberships, and most reported having good attendance at meetings, on average
around 15 out of 20 members attending meetings. Most LEPCs in the sample reported
meeting regularly, with more than 80% of the sample stating that they met at least
quarterly. This is slightly higher than the national average of 72% meeting at least
quarterly according to the USEPA’s 2008 survey.
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The work of the LEPC is still primarily being done on a volunteer basis. While
65% of the sample responded that they do have paid staff, more than 80% of those with
paid staff reported the work as part-time (less than 30 hours per week.) To break it down
further, one-quarter of that 80% part-time staff is working less than five hours per week
on a paid basis. So while there is funding for staff, it is minimal in most cases.
The Ohio sample does appear to have greater funding overall than the US LEPCs
on average, with all groups in the sample reporting some form of operating budget.
USEPA’s 2008 study reports that only 40% of LEPCs stated that they have any operating
budget nationwide. Even if the funding isn’t adequate, some funding must be better than
none. This may be an important distinction between LEPCs in the Ohio sample and
LEPCs nationwide.
Hypothesis testing. Respective compliance and proactivity scores were
calculated from an index for each LEPC in the sample. The components of the index
were taken from individual survey questions and summarized additively with uniform
weights to determine each score. The compliance-proactivity index itself was an
instrument established by Starik et al. (2000) in a previous National LEPC survey
commissioned by the USEPA. It has since been utilized and reported in the literature by
Templeton and Kirk (2008). The compliance component of the index is a straightforward assessment of the regulatory requirements for LEPCs to maintain compliance
with the State Emergency Response Commission. The proactive component of the index
will be discussed below.
Eight hypotheses were tested in the statistical analysis of the survey data.
Correlation, rather than causation, was established where statistically significant
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relationships were noted. Only one of the eight tested hypotheses resulted in a significant
correlation, but each will be discussed briefly.
Hypothesis 1a. LEPC compliance scores are positively correlated with number of
regulated facilities. This hypothesis was tested and confirmed at a statistically significant
level, at a 99% confidence level. This indicates that LEPCs in areas with larger numbers
of regulated facilities are correlated with higher compliance scores. This is a logical
association as more facilities means greater hazard which is an excellent rationale for
increased compliance.
Hypothesis 1b. LEPC proactivity score is not positively correlated with number of
regulated facilities. This hypothesis was not significantly correlated and was therefore
unsupported. This was surprising, as one would expect that proactivity might go up in
areas with more regulated facilities. This is something to consider more thoroughly in
future research.
Hypothesis 2a. LEPC compliance score is not positively correlated with
population size of jurisdiction.
Hypothesis 2b. LEPC proactivity score is mildly positively correlated with
population size of jurisdiction. There was no significant correlation between compliance
and population size or proactivity and population size. However, there was an almost
significant correlation between proactivity and population size ( = -0.023,

= 0.065). It

was expected that areas with larger populations would be more compliant or proactive
than other areas. Future studies may focus on selecting a sample that purposively chooses
matched sets of proactive/ not proactive and compliant/ not compliant groups in order to
study variation in select variables.
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Hypothesis 3a. LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with greater
“urban-ness”.
Hypothesis 3b. LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with greater
“urban-ness”. There was no significant correlative relationship between compliance score
and characterization of the jurisdiction or between proactivity score and the same. It was
expected that more urban areas would be more compliant and more proactive than more
rural areas. Urban areas theoretically have more resources to deal with historically higher
levels of hazardous chemicals. Those resources would seem to lead to greater LEPC
compliance and proactivity in urban areas, but the hypothesis wasn’t borne out.
Hypothesis 4a. LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with more
accident experience.
Hypothesis 4b. LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with more accident
experience. Neither compliance nor proactivity was significantly correlated with
accident experience of LEPC. LEPCs with more accident experience within the past year
were expected to be more compliant and proactive. Direct first-hand experience with
accidents was expected to result in LEPCs being more motivated to meet and possibly
exceed compliance requirements in order to ensure their preparedness for future
accidents. Again, relatively high rates of compliance and proactivity in the sample overall
might account for less sensitivity to variation related to accident experience. Future
research might also address a longer retrospective time horizon for accident experience.
There may be a longer lag time between accident experience and organizational changes
in response to that experience, depending on the pace of change within the organization.
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Other findings. The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is one of the primary
measurable outcomes from LEPC activity, and an important component of disaster
planning in general. In addition to creating a plan for complex and varied emergency
scenarios, LEPCs are expected to update and exercise that plan on a regular basis to
maintain compliance and keep their state funding. Overall, the Ohio sample was updating
and exercising their emergency plans as expected (more than 80% of the time) and
performing fairly well. This would seem a good indication of emergency preparedness.
With 80% of the study sample updating and exercising their ERP as expected, this was
well above the 58% noted in the National 2008 results. This is another important
difference between the Ohio sample and other US LEPCs. One caveat to this positive
measure was the expectation to complete a public briefing.
In the five-year rotation of emergency plan exercises, the public briefing was
noted as being the least likely type of exercise to have occurred; only 28% of sampled
LEPCs stated they had completed a public briefing in the last five years. Again, this
shows that informing the public is one of the weaknesses of LEPC activity. The original
intent of SARA III, the law that mandated the formation of LEPCs, was to use
stakeholder participation to encourage industry compliance with chemical laws, and work
towards reduction of chemicals in highly populated areas. This is an impossible goal with
an uninformed populace. This is an area of major failure for LEPCs, as currently
functioning.
Groups in the sample responded to chemical spills and emergencies far more
often than the nation overall. Nearly 50% of the Ohio sample LEPCs reported responding
to 15 or more accidents in the past year, while only 15% of LEPCs nationwide responded
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to the same number. Ohio appears to be a more active state with regards to number of
accidents than the nation overall. This makes sense given what is known about Ohio’s
chemical facilities. TRI data from 2010 shows Ohio ranking fourth highest amongst all
states for chemical releases (USEPA, 2010).
When asked to prioritize LEPC activities, LEPCs in the sample chose
“community emergency preparedness” (98% of respondents), “hazard vulnerability
assessment” (94% of respondents), and “community hazard awareness” (90% of
respondents) as either activities they “agree” or “strongly agree” are important to their
LEPC. Assessing vulnerabilities and preparing for emergencies corroborates other
findings in the survey, but prioritizing community hazard awareness is a surprise. This
seems incongruent with the lack of public briefings on emergency drills within the last
five years noted amongst three-quarters of the sampled groups.
Since 9/11/01 terrorist attacks, sampled LEPCs did note some changes in the
activity level and emphasis of their organizations. Most notably, 65% of LEPCs stated
that their activity level increased somewhat or greatly with the top three emphasized
activities being emergency planning (80% of response), educating the public (55% of
response), and being proactive (53% of response). Again, providing information to the
public is emphasized as a priority activity since 2001, but evidence for this priority in
action is unclear or absent.
Proactivity. The proactivity index used in this study is the only one the
researcher noted published in the literature reviewed on proactive LEPC activity. The
results of this study suggest that the index is under-conceptualized. As also suggested by
Templeton and Kirk (2008), quantifying as complex an idea as “proactivity” on a simple

117

index score doesn’t capture the complexity and nuance of the activity included in the
concept. There are a myriad of activities that may also be considered proactive that were
not included in the scale. Broader themes of public education and outreach, member
training, and collaboration with other LEPCs might be considered in future
conceptualizing of the idea. More clearly capturing the idea of proactivity may help guide
future practical LEPC directions and also research on the topic. Specifically, as
proactivity has been defined in this and previous studies mentioned by USEPA,
Templeton and Kirk (1998) and others, LEPCs are achieving many of the conditions
defined as proactive. “Proactive” activities such as meeting more frequently, updating
and practicing an ERP more frequently, and making accident prevention
recommendations to industry and local government are being completed by many of the
groups studied in this project.
Given the current complexity and level of hazard we live in, this proactivity may
not go far enough. By taking a more precautionary approach, and focusing on mitigation
and hazard reduction activities, LEPCs can move communities to safer, long-term
sustainable future. By reconceptualizing proactivity as precaution, as defined by the
precautionary principle and some of the related inherent safety concepts, emergency
management activity can be viewed through a different lens which may provide more
nuance into how emergency management functions and a more sustainable future.
Theoretical and Practitioner Implications
Local Emergency Planning Committees were created with the original intent of
using a stakeholder-based model of decision-makers as local participants in the
emergency planning process. Hazard information was to be made publicly available to
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encourage local participation. In order for LEPCs to function as intended, informing and
educating the public and emergency planning participants is a critical step. Without
information and access, the public is unable to address accident/ exposure risk within
their community. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, access to information has been made
more difficult. Public Internet access to Risk Management Program Rule (RMP) data has
been redacted indefinitely. The USEPA recently issued a statement saying that in light of
concerns about ease of access to chemical hazard quantity and location information,
information will continue to be withheld from the internet, and will have to be obtained in
person by qualified parties in order to maintain security due to heightened safety
concerns. Information security is a very valid concern under terrorist threat, but lack of
access to information undermines the very principles upon which SARA III was built.
The results of this study corroborate the inherent difficulties LEPCs experience
with the community education component of the edict. This research found LEPCs in the
study sample to still value or give “lip service” to the idea and merit of informing the
public enough to include it in their mission statements and name it as a priority activity,
but their actual communication activities were limited at best. Most groups hadn’t had a
public meeting to review their emergency plans within the last five years, and many
hadn’t published information regularly to notify the public of meetings. In this study,
90% of respondent LEPCs still state that they value community hazard awareness as a
priority. Despite this intention, only 28% reported exercising their emergency plan with a
public briefing in the past five years. This leads the researcher to question what is causing
this gap between LEPC priorities and actions. The current socio-political climate of
terrorist fears has certainly encumbered the idea of informing the public. Emergency
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Management is looking for ways to best balance community right-to-know with national
security concerns. Practitioners need to work to align their organizational values and
goals with their activities and practices. Undoubtedly, these groups have very limited
resources of both time and money, and need to focus their limited faculties on priority
goals first (first of which is likely maintaining and updating their ERP). Based on their
stated priorities and on those set out by EPCRA, more attention needs to be given to
community education and information to improve LEPC community outcomes.
This indicates that while LEPCs are complying with the letter of the law, they are
not in compliance with the spirit of the law. SARA III’s intent was to use informational
regulation to use stakeholder pressure to improve chemical safety in communities. This is
simply not being done, despite emergency managers expressing a desire to still prioritize
communication with the public.
In addition to concerns with information access, over the last several decades
EHS facilities have been moving out of highly-populated areas towards more
undeveloped “greenfield” areas (Falit-Baiamonte & Osleeb, 2000; Rabe, 1994). EHS
facilities have been pushed to site themselves in less densely populated regions as a part
of the “NIMBY” (not in my backyard) and “LULU” (locally unwanted land use)
movements. This trend may be viewed as beneficial by neighborhoods that no longer see
the blight of chemical facilities and factories near where they live and work. But what is
the consequence of this relocation to emergency management? Are the capabilities of
emergency managers in these areas on par with those in denser urban areas?
The results of this dissertation show a correlation between number of EHS
facilities in a county and the compliance of that county’s LEPC. This would seem a
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positive result, as it shows a relationship between more facilities (hazard) and greater
compliance. This would seem to be a step towards balancing resources towards
communities most in need. There is also a negative correlation between number of
accidents and population size, meaning there is a relationship between larger county
population size and fewer accidents reported in the last five years.
This leads to a few interesting questions. If there is indeed a relationship between
population size and number of accidents, how does this relate to the trend of facilities
moving out of populous areas? Do these LEPCs in more populous areas have greater
access to resources? Public administration literatures cites numerous examples of
organizations in more heavily populated areas having greater access to resources, both
tangible and intangible, which leads to greater performance. If there are fewer accidents
reported in the last five years in areas with greater population, than the converse is true
that there are relatively more accidents in areas with smaller populations (compared to
areas with greater population). These less densely populated areas are likely areas EHS
facilities have trended towards locating in recent decades. Less populated areas may also
be more likely to contain less compliant or proactive LEPCs, who may also be less
educated and potentially less well-funded. This is certainly an area in need of further
investigation, as the above questions indicate.
All emergency planners have been stretched thinner and thinner, figuratively, with
additional responsibilities of homeland security in addition to chemical safety tasks, and
little to no additional funding. Where can underfunded, overburdened, remotely located
LEPCs turn to for aid in critical instances of emergency planning? This researcher
proposes they turn to collaboration. Collaborative efforts allow individual group
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weaknesses to be combined to form stronger networks of emergency management.
Collaborative environmental management (CEM) is one branch of collaboration that has
been described heavily in the natural resource planning literature, and often involves
formal collaboration between the public, private, and non-profit sectors to initiate some
local environmental change (Koontz et al., 2004). Collaboration has been noted amongst
emergency planning agencies between LEPCs and County Emergency Management
Agencies (EMAs), often in the form of shared staff or resources. Collaboration can lead
to greater success for all involved parties. As LEPCs continue to see more demands on
their time and limited opportunities for funding, collaboration will need to be relied on
more heavily as a means of meeting the tasks they have been mandated to complete.
Collaboration with more private citizens and nonprofits along with knowledgeable first
responders, industry representatives, and other emergency managers will help inform the
planning process and better prepare communities to respond to chemical disasters.
Collaboration can also help LEPCs work towards building and sharing “best practices.”
Learning from the experiences of LEPCs state and nation-wide will build stronger
mitigation and response capabilities.
One of the most significant potential barriers to collaboration is access to
information. As RMP information access has become more limited and restrictive,
collaboration between involved parties and the public is also therefore limited. This may
call for more proactive, creative solutions on the part of regulated industry to ensure
emergency plans contain complete hazard information within proper security protocols.
Based on the results of this study, the researcher would strongly recommend that
the State of Ohio and USEPA consider re-evaluating how emergency management is
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handled. If SARA III is to be upheld as written, more attempts need to be made at a
national level to include stakeholders in the process and inform the public about local
hazards. At a state level, the latitude for implementation of the law allows Ohio and other
states to choose to focus on the emergency management approach they best see fit, within
the guidelines of SARA III.
Currently, the approach is very much an after the fact response and recovery
approach. The assumption is that “normal” accidents will happen (Perrow 1984) and that
an emergency managers job is to be best prepared to deal with those accidents when they
do. Shifting LEPCs from a risk reduction/ risk management framework to a hazard
elimination framework would radically re-prioritize their emergency management
activities. Instead of being best prepared to manage accidents, a re-envisioned state or
local emergency management agency could work to prevent accidents from ever
occurring, through incentivizing inherent safety activities or more heavily fining the use
and storage of large quantities of EHS, informing the public about hazards in their area,
and planning communities with large and at-risk populations away from hazard zones.
Taking steps towards a more long-term sustainable goal of informed, active, safer
communities could in the long term be less costly for emergency managers and a more
efficient use of their limited resources. It is unrealistic to think we will live in a society
without chemicals. They are an intimate part of all of our daily lives. But the existence
and use of chemicals should be undertaken with the utmost care and sustainable vision
for their long-term consequence.
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Limitations of This Study and Threats to the Validity of Inferences
Results of this study may be cautiously generalized to other LEPCs within the
United States within certain parameters. There are likely many similarities between
LEPCs in the study sample and LEPCs elsewhere. Many of the characteristics used to
compare the study sample with the United States overall show similarities that lead to the
idea that much of what is noted in the study sample is generalizable to any LEPC in the
country. Demographic characteristics such as community size and characterization (rural
to urban) can be used to classify LEPCs on the basis of similarities for generalization
purposes. LEPCs in the study sample did have several characteristics that appeared
differently than previously stated U.S. averages. LEPCs within the sample had higher
rates of both funding and compliance. This may indicate that many of the issues
identified in this study might be more pronounced in other areas of the country that have
lower levels of funding and compliance.
Once related to the quantity of chemicals present within the sample area (overall),
the sample in this study may just represent one end of the spectrum of nationwide LEPC
possibilities. As stated earlier, the Ohio region ranks fourth nationwide for TRI releases
and quantity of hazardous chemicals stored and utilized. More chemical hazard may
account for the higher than nation-wide average numbers found in this study. That being
said, the results also indicate that the bulk of LEPC energy is still directed towards
emergency plan preparation and other preparedness and response activities, and less so
towards community education and information efforts. If these activities were examined
from the perspective of the disaster management frameworks discussed in the literature,
the sample LEPC works most lines up with the “risk management” and “homeland
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security” frameworks. This author proposes that a more sustainable framework might
include greater emphasis on prevention and precautionary measures. Taking action to
promote removal of hazards by reducing quantities of chemicals stored, storing them in
more stable forms (e.g solid vs. liquid) and simplifying chemical and facility processes
are more efficient uses of emergency managers limited resources when examined from a
long-term perspective in an increasingly complex, chaotic world.
Recommendations for Future Research
In general, the level of proactivity and compliance within the sample was
relatively high. The majority of LEPCs could be considered compliant and at least
moderately proactive. In future studies, it would be useful to address this issue by
selecting a sample through different measures. Selecting matched sets of contrasting
proactive/ not proactive or compliant/ not compliant groups would allow for comparison
of other variables of interest while ensuring the contrast of the dependent variables.
As discussed earlier, a reconceptualization of the term “proactivity” more in line
with the Precautionary Principle or the tenants of Inherent safety would give different
insight into the priorities and emphases of LEPCs, particularly in a larger nationwide
study. In a post-9/11, global climate change world with concerns of increasing terrorist
threat uncertainty as well as climate uncertainty, are emergency managers turning to
more precautionary or preventative means of eliminating hazards and informing the
public, or has the added burden of homeland security responsibilities taxed an already
overburdened set of organizations.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADASHI - Automated Decision-Aided System for Hazardous Incidents
ALOHA - Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres
CAMEO - Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations
DHS - Department of Homeland Security
DOJ - Department of Justice
DOT - Department of Transportation
EHS - Extremely Hazardous Substances
EMA - Emergency Management Agency
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA - Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
ERP - Emergency Response Plan
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
GIS - Geographic Information Systems
HMEP - Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness
LEPC - Local Emergency Planning Committee
NIMS – National Incident Management System
OEMA - Ohio Emergency Management Agency
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration
RMP - Risk Management Plan
SARA III -Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
SERC - State Emergency Response Commission
USEPA - United States Environmental Protection Agency
WISER - Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders
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APPENDIX B
LEPC SURVEY

[Date _____________________]
This questionnaire asks for information regarding the current practices of your LEPC.
Our project focuses on the resources used by your LEPC and its practices. You have been
contacted because you are listed as a current member of an Ohio LEPC either within
EPA’s database or by a roster from your LEPC.
Our objective for the project is to identify how LEPCs are currently functioning in Ohio.
The results of this project will provide important information about how Ohio LEPCs are
working. This current study is funded in part by a grant from the Maxine Levin Goodman
Discretionary Fund, at the Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State. The study
director is Erica Matheny, a PhD Candidate at the Levin College of Urban Affairs, under
the advisement of Dr. William Bowen.
We hope that you will find the time to participate in our current study. The questionnaire
should take less than 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in the study is voluntary.
The information obtained during the survey will be held in a password-protected
computer and will only be accessible by the researchers on the project. The results will
only be reported in summary; no individual responses will be made public. In no way
will your responses be identifiable to you personally.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact the CSU
Institutional Review Board at (216) 687-3630. By completing and submitting this survey
online, you are agreeing that you understand your rights as a participant in this study.

If you have any questions regarding the study or this questionnaire, please contact Erica Matheny, 330285-4790, or Dr. William Bowen, Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU (216-687-9226.) Ms. Matheny is
the director of the study, under the advisement of Dr. Bowen.
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I.

Contact Information

Check here if you’d
like a summary of the results

Name & Position
LEPC affiliated with
Address
Telephone/ Fax
Email

II.

About Your Community
2. What size population does your LEPC serve?
< 50,000
50,001 – 100,000
100,001 – 500,000
500,001 – 1,000,000
> 1,000,000
3.

How would you describe your LEPC’s service area?
Mainly Rural
Mixed Rural/ Suburban
Mainly Suburban
Mixed Suburban/ Rural
Mainly Urban

III. About LEPC Members
4.

Which of the following organizations participate in your LEPC? Check all that
apply.
Civil Defense/Emergency Services
Firefighting
Schools
Chief Administrative Officer's Staff
Law Enforcement
Labor Groups
State/Local Elected Officials
Public Health
Newsmedia
Emergency Medical/Hospitals
Local Industry
Agriculture
Municipal/County Attorney's Office
Truck/Rail Carriers
Community Groups
Planning/Community Development
Environmental Agency
Red Cross/Volunteer Groups
Public Works/Engineering
Other (please list): _______________________________________________________

5a.
b.

How many members make up your LEPC?
On average, how many usually attend meetings of the LEPC?
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____ members
____ members

6.

How long has the current LEPC chair...
0-12 mos.
been a member of the LEPC
been chair of the LEPC .....................................

7.

a. Does your LEPC have any paid full or part-time staff?
b. How many hours per week do they work for the LEPC?

1-2 yrs

3-4 yrs

5+ yrs

Yes No
______ hours

8. Does your LEPC...
have a formal orientation program for new member ............................
have any subcommittees .......................................................................
set annual goals and objectives for itself ..............................................
set annual goals and objectives for its subcommittees..........................
assess its performance annually or more frequently .............................
discuss this performance appraisal within the LEPC ............................
present the performance appraisal orally or in writing to local officials

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

IV. About your LEPCs Activities
9. How many times did your LEPC meet during the last year (2008)?
_____________________
10. Where does your LEPCs operating budget come from? (check all that apply)
State fees from EPCRA submission
Federal – HMEP grant funding
Local direct funding
Other state direct funding
Local fees
Private Industry
In-kind/Indirect support
Other
No formal funding or direct support
11. In the past five years, did your LEPC receive technical assistance or guidance from
any of the following agencies?
Federal EPA
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Transportation
Department of Justice
Federal Emergency Management Agency
State agencies (SERC, OEMA, OEPA)
12. When did your LEPC last review and update its emergency response plan?
Less than 12 months
1-2 years
over 2 years
Do not have an emergency response plan
Do not know when last reviewed/updated
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13. When did the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) last review your
emergency response plan?
Less than 12 months
1-2 years
over 2 years
No Review
14. How familiar are you with your LEPC’s emergency response plan?
Very Familiar
Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not at all Familiar
EXERCISE ERP
15.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Has your LEPC exercised its emergency plan through a:
single function (e.g., communications) drill ...................................
Yes
No
“table-top” hazmat exercise ...........................................................
Yes
No
full scale (i.e., multidepartmental) hazmat emergency exercise .....
Yes
No
Actual emergency ...........................................................................
Yes
No
Public briefing ................................................................................
Yes
No
Other _(please list)__________________________________________________

16. When did your LEPC last exercise its emergency plan?
Less than 12 months
1-2 years
over 2 years
Exercised, do not know when
17. In the past five years, approximately how many chemical accidents to which
emergency agencies responded have occurred in your LEPC’s service area?
None
1-5
6-10
11-15
15 or more
18. How did these chemical accidents impact the way your LEPC operates? (check all
that apply)
No impact
Revised ERP
Improved coordination
Extended LEPC
Increased meeting frequency
Greater attention/effort towards accident prevention
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19. How many facilities in your area exceed the Threshold Planning Quantity of
Extremely Hazardous Substances?
____________ facilities
20. For how many facilities have you determined the size of their Vulnerable Zones using
DOT's Emergency Response Guidebook____________ facilities
EPA's Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis ____________ facilities
computer models (e.g., CAMEO or ALOHA)____________ facilities
GIS____________ facilities
other methods____________ facilities
(Please list)______________________________________________________.
21.

Which of the following resources does your LEPC employ for chemical
information, emergency planning, drills, and actual emergencies?
CAMEO
Risk Management Program (RMP) data
Other GIS data
EPCRA Tier I & Tier II data
Other resources (please
list)_________________________________________________

22. Please rate the degree to which your LEPC has used each of
the following resources in SARA Title III emergency planning.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
23.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Not
National Response Team Hazardous Materials Emergency
at all
Planning Guide (NRT-1) ............................................................. 1
EPA technical guidebooks or planning manuals ............................ 1
State emergency planning agency
hazardous materials planning manuals & training courses .......... 1
Chemical Manufacturers Association videotapes, handbooks,
& training courses ......................................................................... 1
FEMA or EPA training courses or broadcasts ................................ 1
State environmental agency Toxic Release Inventory data ............ 1
guest speakers ................................................................................. 1
other training films or videotapes ................................................... 1

2
2

3
3

2

3

4

5

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

Please rate the degree to which your LEPC was active
in each of the following areas during 2008.

Not
at all
Hazard vulnerability assessment .................................................... 1
Community emergency preparedness ............................................. 1
Chemical release prevention ........................................................... 1
Community hazard awareness ........................................................ 1
Community hazard reduction .......................................................... 1
Inherent safety opportunity audits .................................................. 1
Activities that reward hazard reduction .......................................... 1
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Very great
extent
4 5
4 5

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Very great
extent
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5

24. Since the events of 9/11, the overall activity of your LEPC has:
Increased greatly
Increased somewhat
Stayed the same
Decreased somewhat
Decreased greatly
Don’t know
25. Since 9/11, has your LEPCs increased its emphasis on:
Emergency planning
Hazard reduction/ Accident prevention
Educating the public
Being proactive
26. Since 9/11, has your LEPC changed the way chemical hazard information is made
available to the public due to homeland security concerns?
Yes
No
27. The LEPC on which I serve has had a positive impact on chemical safety in the
community (prevention, preparedness, and response.)
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
No
28. Which of the following terms are you familiar with or do
you believe your LEPC incorporates into its mission?

I’m Familiar LEPCs
mission
Inherent safety .................................................................................
Precautionary principle ...................................................................
Primary Prevention .........................................................................
Hazard Reduction............................................................................

29. Rank your LEPC’s contact (telephone, letter, email, or face-to-face) with each of the
following during 2008, from most frequent (#1) to least frequent (#9). (#0 for not
applicable)
_____
FEMA regional staff
_____
EPA regional staff
_____
State emergency management agency
_____
State environmental agency
_____
LEPCs in adjacent jurisdictions
_____
LEPCs in other jurisdictions of your state
_____
LEPCs in other states
_____
Regional or Multi-jurisdictional LEPC Association
_____
Other __________________________________________________
Does your LEPC have a website? If so, please list here: _________________________
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30. Is there any other information that you feel is important for us to know regarding
your LEPCs work?
___________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Thank you very much for your participation in our research. If you are
interested in receiving a summary of this research when it is completed, please
indicate so near your name on the first page of the survey.
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APPENDIX C

IRB APPROVAL FORM
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